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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To address the spread and severity of online hate and disinformation, and the mammoth 
challenge they have posed to human rights protection, this strategy paper calls for keen 
attention toward dynamic scenarios where online vitriolic expressions, actors, practices, 
networks, and technologies are in a state of constant flux and evolution, and therefore, evasive 
and slippery for regulatory action and policy making. Keeping this in view, the paper proposes 
four priority areas for UN entities:
 ► tackling global unevenness in platform governance
 ► connecting critical communities 
 ► monitoring ‘gray’ zones, fringe actors, and smaller/domestic platforms 
 ► engaging repressive states to tackle coordinated disinformation and hate campaigns.
To explore the dynamism of online vitriol and policy measures in the priority areas, the paper 
builds on the framework of ‘extreme speech’ rather than the more commonly invoked term, 
‘hate speech’. ‘Extreme speech’ emphasizes the importance of longer histories of exclusion, 
racialization and dispossession that underpin contemporary digital manifestations of hate. At 
the same time, it draws attention to rapidly mutating online user practices including recent 
trends of hateful language that comes cloaked in ‘funny’ memes and wordplays, and intricate 
networks of political manipulation that draw not only on technology but also social trust.
The normative emphasis of the ‘hate speech’ discourse hinges on the imperative for immediate 
action, and hence raises the risk of glossing over historical trajectories, cultural subtleties and 
evolving ground realities. 
Moving beyond technological solutionism, crisis driven actions and moral panics about 
digital communication, the framework of extreme speech offers a way to develop culturally 
appropriate and holistic interventions. Such interventions can be grouped under four 
interconnected levels (global, national, bilateral and local/community) and a mix of five high-
level action frames (intermediation, policy pressure, connection, monitoring, and training/
awareness) relevant for each level. 
Global Interventions
Global unevenness in platform governance
Existing social media platform governance practices around online extreme speech range 
from very strict regulations to very lax scenarios globally. Taking note of this vast unevenness, 
UN entities should mobilize political and diplomatic tools to facilitate the implementation of 
best practices across Member States, drawing lessons from some of the latest regulations and 
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policy proposals including:
• the principle of proportionality to assign greater obligations to large social media 
platforms for timely removal of illegal content, proactive risk mitigation and transparency 
measures
• regulations for online advertising and recommender systems
• robust systems for notices and trusted flaggers
• provision for independent auditing, code of conduct and independent dispute settlement 
bodies
• access to data for bona fide research
• online interface and interactive architectures that have the potential to change user 
behavior
• fair corporate practices for content moderation by removing opaque and exploitative 
arrangements around outsourced labor
Connection
Another key intervention on a global scale (replicable at the national and community levels) 
is to connect existing critical stakeholder communities to leverage, incubate, curate, and 
expand on best practices including coping strategies and countertactics to online extreme 
speech. Connection is an important action frame because there are already a large number of 
grassroots initiatives and organizations that are active in countering online hate. Connecting 
them for specific goals around different aspects of online hate can significantly increase their 
effectiveness and scalability and can also provide ways to address systemic issues such as racial 
bias. One example is the AI4Dignity project, which is developing a replicable process model 
to create collaborative spaces of coding by connecting artificial intelligence (AI) developers, 
fact checkers and academic ethnographers from different countries to detect and label 
extreme speech. Such activities will not only help in expanding technology access for the fact 
checking communities but also in addressing critical systemic issues such as bias and lack 
of transparency in AI-assisted content moderation by bringing more inclusive and culturally 
sensitive datasets. AI4Dignity’s key focus is on fact checkers because they comprise a critical 
community with vast contextual knowledge about extreme speech. They are also often the 
targets of online extreme speech. UN entities can facilitate and fund collaborative coding 
spaces by involving other critical communities with similar contextual knowledge such as 
online comedians, anti-hate advocacy groups, grassroots digital influencers and independent 
journalists advocating for social justice. 
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Country Level Interventions
UN entities should support long-term studies for nuanced measures based on distinct media 
ecosystems that have evolved within different countries. However, three areas of intervention 
require urgent attention across the board:
Repressive and authoritarian assaults on online speech
 ► In cases of state aligned coordinated attacks or authoritarian controls over platform 
regulations, and dramatic turmoil when companies feel the pressure to take swift actions at 
the cost of due diligence processes, UN entities should apply pressure to, and if necessary, 
support social media companies to comply with global standards of content moderation 
and human rights protection by offering procedural clarity around escalation protocols and 
decision making. An institutionalized global structure to regularly convene social media 
companies to address repressive assaults on online speech will be a significant step towards 
addressing upheavals that unfold at the national levels. Convening different social media 
companies is especially critical during elections since disinformation campaigns funded by 
resource rich political parties have begun to increasingly adopt cross-platform manipulation 
tactics. 
 ► When ruling governments are directly involved in digital disinformation and hate 
campaigns, it is critical to partner with civil society monitoring groups and global digital 
rights organizations for awareness raising and capacity building of key State actors such as 
judges and the judicial personnel. UN entities can also provide context sensitive positive 
narratives to social media companies to engage hate influencers online for user education 
and sensitization.
 ► Repressive regimes have begun to copycat stricter regulatory models adopted in developed 
economies with stable democratic systems for authoritarian controls over speech in their 
own countries. Monitoring how governments emulate stricter regulatory models and 
deploy AI-assisted technologies for repressive purposes is a critical area of intervention. 
Gray zones, fringe actors and smaller/domestic platforms
 ► Engaging the “Big Tech” is crucial but policy measures should recognize that regulatory 
control over large transnational social media companies would not fully solve a complex 
social and economic problem. Political manipulation of online discourse through algorithmic 
and computational affordances has become the new face of electoral propaganda globally, 
but especially in the global South, partisan politics has spawned a breeding shadow industry 
that operates through gray practices of clickbait operators, hired influencers, and loosely 
knit networks of dispersed amplifiers who are drawn into precarious and informal labor 
arrangements crafted by ambitious mediators.
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 ► Monitoring and supporting compliance to global standards among smaller, homegrown 
platforms and data influence services is important because they are increasingly implicated 
in shadow practices of extreme speech. Hate speakers have also often migrated to smaller 
platforms to avoid the regulatory gaze. 
Gender based abuses 
Gender-based abusive trolling is a particularly virulent form of online extreme speech and a 
disturbing trend that cuts across diverse cultures with vastly different levels of protection and 
opportunities for women and sexual minorities.
 ► Connection is a key action frame in this area. UN entities should connect anti-harassment 
campaigns crafted in different parts of the world for specific programs including digital 
safety trainings, free legal counsel, cyber harassment helpline, capacity building for reporting 
abusive content on social media platforms, partnerships with social media companies for 
quick response/redressal, and proposals for legislative reforms. 
 ► UN entities should also help forge connections between anti-harassment campaigns 
and creative online feminist projects such as video tutorials and multimodal first-person 
narratives of women to push back against online trolling. 
 ► Social media advertisers should be targeted to demote gender abusive content.
 ► In contexts where gender-based abuse is entangled with partisan or repressive politics 
targeting minorities and political opponents, the problem must be tackled as part of a 
broader set of tactics aimed at engaging repressive regimes and gray zones.
Bilateral and Geopolitical Interventions
Extreme speech is also a weaponized tool in bilateral and geopolitical conflicts to create and 
reinforce sentiments of mistrust, exclusion, fear, and anger toward perceived external enemies, 
and to also unite allies. In relation to this specific variant of online extreme speech, UN 
entities should evolve strategies in conjunction with diplomatic tools for intermediation and 
de-escalation, foremost by engaging key actors in Member States, introducing independent 
mediation and expertise, and combining these interventions with awareness raising activities 
among common online users.
Community Level Interventions and Deep Extreme Speech
If one part of extreme speech circulation relates to technology specific features of virality and 
algorithmic mediation, a significant part of it operates by tapping social trust and cultural 
capital at community levels, often making deep inroads into the “intimate sphere” of families, 
kin networks, neighbors, caste-based groups, ethnic groups, and other socially rooted 
formations as well as by building on historical structures of privilege. Mobilizing community 
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level awareness programs and rapid response systems that are sensitive to diverse social 
conditions of digital hate cultures is critical in addressing what might be described as “deep 
extreme speech”. Key fields of action include:
 ► Partnering with local cultural influencers for organic influence in social media networks 
(such as WhatsApp groups) to promote positive narratives
 ► Mobilizing inclusive narratives and awareness raising by extending the network of partners 
to include not only conventional beneficiaries such as NGOs but also online comedians, 
poets, musicians, cinema celebrities, online meme creators, and online game developers 
 ► Developing counterspeech and positive campaigns by using memes, GIFs, humorous posts 
and coordinated ‘likes’ for promoting the posts so that push back responses are culturally 
appropriate and digitally contemporary
 ► Convening self-styled political trolls, local politicians, and commercial digital influencers 
for awareness raising activities, and sensitizing them about global human rights standards 
and the dangers of digital campaign manipulations 
 ► Strengthening grassroots anti-racist and anti-hate communities to report online extreme 
speech to social media companies and monitor progress once complaints are raised
 ► Strengthening local communities to petition lawmakers to support victims of online 
harassment and raise resources for legal help
 ► Offering technical support to local groups to develop hate monitoring dashboards
 ► Empowering local groups to mobilize community ‘bystander support’ when victims of 
online hate choose to make their complaints public
 ► Partnering with existing anti-hate media programs (radio, television, and print) to evolve 
integrated polymedia responses against online hate  
 ► Developing innovative means of sensitizing hate speakers by channelizing donations to 
antihate groups for every instance of offensive and hateful speech act spotted online (i.e., 
hate speakers would be funding anti-hate initiatives each time they post a hateful message 
and thus undermining their own agendas).
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INTRODUCTION
This strategy paper outlines critical and potential areas of engagement for UN entities to 
foster an open, safe, and accountable internet by addressing the spread and severity of online 
extreme speech, and the mammoth challenge they have posed to human rights protection. 
Moving beyond technological solutionism, crisis driven actions and moral panics about 
digital communication, it recommends investing in processes that can build sustainable 
communities of practice in a decentralized and connected ecosystem at the global, national, 
bilateral and community levels. This involves identifying key risk areas that require urgent 
and concerted top-level action focusing on governments and online social media platforms, 
and a longer-term engagement to combat hate within everyday cultures of online exchange. It 
calls for keen attention toward dynamic scenarios where online extreme speech expressions, 
actors, practices, networks, and technologies are in a state of constant flux and evolution, and 
therefore, evasive and slippery for regulatory action and policy making. 
Recognizing the vast array of actions already activated by governments, multilateral agencies, 
local communities, internet intermediary service providers, academia, internet watchdogs 
and other stakeholders, as well as ongoing charged debates around what approaches are 
appropriate and what are inept, this paper proposes four priority areas for UN entities that 
can support, expand, and leverage existing efforts; set benchmarks for critical response; and 
intervene where other efforts have so far remained inadequate. It urges UN entities to focus 
their resources and expertise on:
• tackling global unevenness in platform governance
• connecting critical communities 
• monitoring ‘gray’ zones, fringe actors, and smaller/domestic platforms
• engaging repressive states to tackle coordinated disinformation and hate campaigns.
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EXTREME SPEECH FRAMEWORK
To explore the dynamism of online vitriol and develop agile and context-sensitive responses 
in these priority areas, this paper builds on the framework of “extreme speech” rather than the 
more commonly invoked term, “hate speech”. This shift is for several reasons:
 ► Focus on practice: Extreme speech framework emphasizes the need to focus on media 
practice, i.e., what people do that is related to media and how they reconfigure and 
reproduce broader structures of power within which such practices are embedded. The 
media practice perspective signals the importance of people’s agency set within structural 
conditions of power and resulting dynamism in online ecosystems. Rather than focusing 
only on online content and data forensics, a keen understanding of online practices and 
online users’ lifeworlds is needed to understand emergent forms of online hate and various 
networks of circulation that intricately intermingle to perpetuate them.
 ► Ambiguity of speech: Extreme speech framework emphasizes the situated nature of speech 
cultures. The same expression could work as subversive speech in some contexts, and 
hateful speech in others. The implications of incivility or extremeness of speech cannot 
be understood without analyzing particular forms of recognition and responsiveness to 
people’s demands that exist in societies. In some contexts, expectations of civil language 
are an expression of power and subversive politics engages in extreme forms of speech 
to challenge the status quo. In other words, extreme speech can be a way to speak back 
to authorities, and policy measures should be sensitive to which groups engage in these 
speech forms, and what their relative power position is within particular social and political 
contexts. 
 ► Limits of hate speech: Distinct from the normative emphasis of hate speech which comes 
with a heavy evaluative load, extreme speech stresses the importance of comprehension 
over classification and proposes to develop measures by understanding (if not condoning) 
actors, practices, and networks that constitute vitriolic cultures online. 
 ► Dangers of the “hate speech discourse”: Multifarious and often manipulative political 
agendas have grown around the regulatory discourse of hate speech. Examples abound 
where regimes have misused the hate speech discourse to squash dissent or target 
vulnerable groups. Repressive states have (mis)used the concepts of hate speech and lately 
disinformation by conjoining them with sedition, threat to national security, blasphemy, 
defamation, and other legislations. In everyday conversational contexts, hate speech is 
often used as a charge or an accusation that closes off, rather than opens up, avenues for 
change and dialogue.1  
1  Habashi, B. (2013). Speaking Hatefully: Culture, Communication and Political Action in Hungary. University 
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 ► Lived concepts: Extreme speech perspective calls for working with lived concepts and 
emic categories of communities for developing policy measures rather than the normative 
language imposed from the outside. 
 ► Epistemic parity and historical awareness: Extreme speech research calls for deep 
contextualization that can account for grave historical continuities of racialization and 
dispossession instead of framing ongoing digital turbulences as a sudden crisis caused 
by digital communication. This entails systematic inquiries into longer histories of racial 
construction and hierarchies shaped by colonialism that have been revived and weaponized 
by current regimes, including those aimed against people within one’s own national 
communities. The normative emphasis of the hate speech discourse hinges on the imperative 
for immediate action, and hence raises the risk of glossing over historical trajectories. 
Following this point of departure, extreme speech research has stressed for epistemic parity, 
and the call to depart from the self-righteous schema of the rational-liberal center (the self-
understanding of the West) and the extreme periphery (the rendering of the non-West). The 
logic of the rational West versus the extreme other has long informed media development 
and media policy traditions engaged in tailoring solutions for hate speech. The extreme 
speech framework stresses that there is no center and periphery when it comes to violent 
emotionality of words. This critical perspective offers ways to identify global patterns, styles, 
and tropes of hateful speech that circulate between different repressive and exclusionary 
scenarios within and between the global North and the global South in the current digital age. 
In terms of its definitional scope, extreme speech analysis draws a distinction between 
“derogatory extreme speech” aimed at any group (including those holding power) and 
“exclusionary extreme speech” that implicitly or explicitly excludes or causes harm to a person 
or a group on the basis of their group belonging.2  In terms of exclusionary extreme speech, 
the analysis builds on existing definitional standards around hate speech set up by the United 
Nations3  and the distinction that Wardle and Derakhshan draw between disinformation 
(“when false information is knowingly shared to cause harm”) and malinformation (“when 
genuine information is shared to cause harm”).4 Extreme speech analysis covers misinformation 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
2  See the section on AI4Dignity project in this paper (pp 22–23) for full definitions of these terms.
3  United Nations. (2020). United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech: A Detailed Guidance on 
Implementation for United Nations Field Presences. The UN definition identifies hate speech as “Any kind of 
communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language 
with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, 
ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor. This is often rooted in, and 
generates, intolerance and hatred, and in certain contexts can be demeaning and divisive”.
4  See Wardle, C., and Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information Disorder: Towards an Interdisciplinary 
Framework for Research and Policy Making. Council of Europe, https://edoc.coe.int/en/
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(spreading false information without the intention to cause harm) so far as it is part of the social 
fields where deliberate efforts to spread hate activate a variety of actors and networks that end 
up spreading hateful language that could cause harm to vulnerable groups. The purpose of 
extreme speech analysis is therefore to exceed the legal focus on culpability and to instead 
analyze—with ethnographic and historical depth— the actual ways in which different actors 
and actions come to animate one another, and how new interventions need to be crafted to 
address not only those who deliberately “engineer” hateful language and disinformation but 
also those who are “taken by it” or do it to earn a livelihood. While recognizing the importance 
of crafting specific actions against actors and entities that deliberately spread hate, extreme 
speech analysis nonetheless widens the scope of culpability centric legal-normative analysis 
to a broader social-cultural analysis. This approach allows us to chart new analytical pathways 
and fields of action beyond intentionality-based investigations. Some of these fields of action 
in terms of connection, collaboration, and culturally appropriate trust-based interventions 
are highlighted throughout this paper.
In terms of research, using this framework and gleaning from cases around the world, 
extreme speech analysis has highlighted that in the last two decades, online vitriol and 
hateful cantankerous cultures have precipitated a condition of violent exclusion5 based on 
“exacerbated fracture lines of difference that include race, gender, sexuality, religion, nation 
and class” in a context where “computational capital has built itself and its machines out of 
those capitalized and technologized social differentiations”.6  
On the level of digital practice, ethnographic studies in extreme speech research have shown 
that emerging vocabularies of hateful speech blend with idioms and humor genres that have 
cultural approval in local or national contexts.7 Online hateful speech often comes dressed 
as jokes, “funny” memes, witty name calling, sobriquets, wordplays, and coded language. 
Furthermore, digital technologies have provided ways to develop new forms of extreme speech 
media/7495-information- disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research- 
and-policy-making.html accessed 15 March 2020. Now available at https://rm.coe.int/
information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77
5  Udupa, S. (2017). Gaali Cultures: The Politics of Abusive Exchange on Social Media. New Media & Society, 
20 (4), 1506–22. Udupa, S, Gagliardone, I., & Hervik, P. (eds.) (2021). Digital Hate: The Global Conjuncture 
of Extreme Speech. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Udupa, S., and Pohjonen, M. (2019). Extreme 
Speech and Global Digital Cultures. International Journal of Communication, 13, 3049–67.
6  Beller, J. (2003). Numismatics of the Sensual, Calculus of the Image: The Pyrotechnics of Control. Image & 
Narrative, http://www.imageandnarrative.be/inarchive/mediumtheory/jonathanlbeller.htm
7  For instance, see Haynes, N. (2019). Writing on the Walls: Discourses on Bolivia Immigrants in Chilean 
Meme Humor. International Journal of Communication, 13, 3122–42 for a discussion on internet memes 
that target Bolivian immigrants in northern Chile. See also Hervik, P. (2019). Ritualized Opposition in 
Danish Online Practices of Extremist Langauge and Thought. International Journal of Communication, 13, 
3104–21.
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that come in the guise of “facts” and “evidence-based” untruths targeting specific groups rather 
than employing explicitly derogatory and dehumanizing language. “Deep fakes” are a good 
example for how digital mediation allows ways to present discriminatory and hateful language 
as trustworthy information that appeals to visceral apprehension, often confusing the senses. 
These trends suggest that there is an emerging overlap between digital disinformation and 
hateful speech, although each cannot be reduced to the other. Even more gravely, repressive 
and authoritarian regimes have weaponized online extreme speech, subjecting their own 
citizens to violent surveillance, and violating human rights norms in their policies towards 
refugees, immigrants, minorities, and historically disadvantaged communities. There are thus 
global (technologized) patterns to exclusions as well as national and local manifestations that 
are often culturally sanctioned and regime backed.
How can UN entities devise novel and effective ways to combat this complex scenario?
Without doubt, UN actors and entities should work with regional and national level legislations 
around hateful speech, but they need to simultaneously address broad ranging developments 
that can impact foundational definitions, especially where human rights obligations of States 
are waning and protections to vulnerable communities are under direct attack. Importantly, 
they should support and evolve mechanisms that can embed extreme speech moderation and 
mitigation efforts within democratic processes, however messy and prolonged these processes 
might be. 
Drawing attention to the dynamic flows of online extreme speech that are simultaneously 
global, national, and local, this paper urges UN actors to develop a multiprong, multi-layered 
approach that can build robust flexibility and context sensitivity into response and mitigation 
strategies. 
The rest of the paper will present a schema to situate the importance of the four priority areas 
flagged at the beginning, elaborating on other areas of action that are related to them, and 
how they can be developed both as a specific mix of measures and holistically, to address the 
problem of online extreme speech. 
Towards developing a systematic approach, the paper will first offer definitions of a set of high-
level action frames for UN entities and the rationale underpinning them. Following this, it 
proposes strategies for four distinct yet overlapping domains of intervention (global, national, 
bilateral, and local) by highlighting a mix of action frames relevant for each domain. The 
paper will unpack the action frames by offering a set of concrete measures that can be further 
developed and combined based on a grounded understanding of the specific challenges relevant 
for different domains of intervention. Each action frame involves engagement with one or 
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more stakeholders: governments, social media platforms (as part of the broader set of internet 
intermediary service providers), civil society organizations (CSOs)/NGOs/communities and 
academia/researchers. The paper will discuss illustrative cases to demonstrate the relevance 
and benefits of different measures as well as possible challenges and further work. 
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ACTION FRAMES
8  This builds on Goldman and Chen’s (2010) application of a layered model of regulation for public 
service broadcasting. They suggest that public service media should encompass a wider range of content 
providers and information activists through a decentralized mechanism that addresses all the four 
layers—physical infrastructure, connection (between various platforms engaged in public service media), 
curation (supporting content and services of public value) and creation (creating content that the market 
insufficiently or erroneously addresses).  See Goldman, E., & Chen, A. H. (2010). Modelling policy for new 
public service media networks. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 24(1), 111–170.
 ► Intermediation – involves 
strategic mediations between 
governments and social media 
platforms, especially in evolv-
ing sound country level regu-
latory practices; between so-
cial media companies and 
researchers, as part of the 
transparency agenda and re-
search access; and between 
governments and researchers 
when critical research on on-
line extreme speech is threat-
ened by repressive states.
 ►Policy pressure – involves 
specific strategic action 
points, including addressing 
global unevenness in platform 
governance; placing pressure 
on social media companies to 
fund grassroots organizations 
and research activities aimed 
at tackling extreme speech; 
and addressing threats to ac-
tivists and political misuse of 
legal provisions. A global in-
stitutional structure to regu-
larly convene social media 
companies (both large and 
small), state regulators, and 
CSOs at the UNHQ is critical.
 ►Connection – involves con-
necting, curating, and scaling 
up already existing critical 
communities in a multilateral 
way (rather than in the hub-
spoke model)8 that can lever-
age the UN’s vast global reach 
and community level organi-
zation and offer scalability to 
related initiatives in the area 
of extreme speech mitigation. 
These critical communities 
include fact checkers, an-
ti-hate groups, online comedi-
ans, AI developers, and inde-
pendent journalists. Such 
connections are important 
also because they can bring 
people centric perspectives to 
machine learning models to 
operationalize the ‘human-in-
the-loop’ principle and inclu-
sive AI, in the current context 
where AI systems are playing 
an increasingly important role 
in extreme speech ampli f i -
ca t ion  and  moder a t ion . 
 ►Moni tor ing  –  invol ves 
strengthening efforts to mon-
itor online extreme speech 
patterns by integrating ongo-
ing initiatives and new com-
missioned research to develop 
online hate dashboards and 
shared database. 
 ►Training and awareness – 
include consultations and 
awareness raising about 
global standards around hate-
ful speech and international 
human rights norms. These 
activities also include re-
source sharing for best prac-
tices and creative interven-
tions that are in sync with 
digitally native habits, styles, 
and jargons. This could be 
achieved by expanding the 
ambit of participants beyond 
conventional beneficiaries 
such as local NGOs into a 
broader range of actors—pol-
iticians, self-identifying trolls, 
online game developers, on-
line meme generators, entre-
preneurial digital influencers, 
and victims of online extreme 
speech.
A combination of action frames can be mobilized for different levels of interventions.
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GLOBAL INTERVENTIONS
*Key action frames: Policy pressure and Connection*
The boundary defying tendency of digital technologies and the global reach of transnational 
tech companies have led to an upsurge of information flows that crisscross conventional 
territorial borders in unforeseen ways. On the one hand, digital participatory cultures have 
facilitated anti-authoritarian uprisings and multifarious social movements around climate 
justice, anti-racism (#BlackLivesMatter), decolonization, anti-harassment (#MeToo) and 
other pertinent issues, infusing these struggles with planetary resonance. On the other 
hand, the same infrastructural possibilities have enabled hateful speech to augment and gain 
virality on a global scale. Although there are still large gaps in global research on the topic 
and there is no consensus on whether online hate speech is on the rise, existing studies have 
shown that there are globally circulating tropes and resources that shape and ramp up online 
hateful expressions. Anti-legacy media criticism and skepticism, for instance, is a trope that 
is common across online right-wing supporters in Germany, the US, India, Denmark, Turkey, 
Hungary and other countries.9 Beyond thematic patterns, there are globally shared cultures 
of online use and extreme speech formats that variously enable people to say things that they 
would not say in “real life” interactional situations. Internet memes and trolling are illustrative 
examples for how globally shared digital formats and practices can provide the means for 
exclusionary discourses of different kinds to manifest and amplify within distinct national 
or regional contexts. The format-inducing effects of the global internet are strikingly evident 
in digital fun cultures that embed distance and deniability in hateful exchange.10 Trolls are 
able to participate in collective celebration of aggression—cheering each other and jeering at 
opponents—and simultaneously distancing themselves from the consequences of what they 
say and do online. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the global dimension of online extreme speech is the 
influence of transnational tech companies and the diverse policies they have evolved around 
hate speech moderation. UN entities have a particularly important role to play in engaging 
transnational internet intermediary service providers and social media platforms and apply 
pressure for legal compliance and social responsibility. Rather than overemphasizing the 
aspect of media literacy that implicitly places the burden upon ordinary online users to report 
9  For instance, a study based on online content analysis found that there are common vocabularies of 
hateful speech between “international” alt-right groups and parts of the Irish digital sphere. See Siapera, 
E., Moreo, E., & Zhou, J. (2018). Hate Track: Tracking and Monitoring Racist Speech Online. Dublin: Irish 
Human Rights and Equality Commission.
10 Udupa, S. (2019). Nationalism in the Digital Age: Fun as a Metapractice of Extreme Speech.  
 International Journal of Communication, 13, 3143–63.
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extreme speech and detect disinformation, a significant part of critical measures should be 
concentrated on social media companies and their obligations toward upholding democratic 
values. The foremost of these measures, this paper suggests, is to address global unevenness 
in platform governance.  
Policy Pressure: Platform Governance
Existing platform governance practices around online extreme speech globally range from very 
strict regulations to very lax scenarios. There are high penalties on social media companies for 
non-compliance and failure to respond within tighter timeframes in countries like Germany11 
and France.12 Similarly, federal laws in Ethiopia require social media companies to remove 
hate speech or disinformation in one day.13 If Singapore’s latest regulation has raised an outcry 
around what is dubbed as the “Orwellian fake news law”,14 China’s restrictive censorship laws 
are long known for raising the indomitable “firewall”. At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are countries where social media companies do not even meet the formal requirements of 
appointing a legal representative to address the concerns that users and authorities raise.15 
In Brazil, Facebook has exempted politicians from fact checking, despite fact checkers 
complaining with evidence that elected representatives regularly relay hateful speech and 
disinformation.16 Following the dramatic Capitol Riot in 2021, Twitter suspended the accounts 
11  https://www.bmjv.de/DE/Themen/FokusThemen/NetzDG/NetzDG_EN_node.html accessed19 February 
2021. The Network Enforcement Act, NetzDG 2017, requires social networks to remove “manifestly 
illegal content” within 24 hours or face heavy fines up to “5 million euros against the person responsible 
for the complaints management system” and “the fine against the company itself can be up to 50 million 
euros.” The law has a broad definition of punishable content. Aside from “punishable fake news and 
other unlawful content, it includes “insult, malicious gossip, defamation, public incitement to crime, 
incitement to hatred, disseminating portrayals of violence and threatening the commission of a felony.”
12  In May 2020, France adopted a bill to counter online hate (Projet de loi Avia, the Avia Law). Digital 
rights advocates have criticized the regulations in France and Germany for abdicating the due diligence 
process of appropriate judicial review before content removal. See https://www.article19.org/resources/
france-the-online-hate-speech-law-is-a-serious-setback-for-freedom-of-expression/, accessed 19 March 
2021. In June 2020, the French Constitutional Council declared that the main provisions of the “Avia law” 
unconstitutional https://edri.org/our-work/french-avia-law-declared-unconstitutional-what-does-this-
teach-us-at-eu-level/ accessed 19 March 2021.
13  https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2020/05/Hate-Speech-and-Disinformation-Prevention-
and-Suppression-Proclamation.pdf accessed 18 March 2021.
14  https://rsf.org/en/2020-world-press-freedom-index-entering-decisive-decade-journalism-exacerbated-
coronavirus accessed 15 February 2021.
15  The flip side of this regulatory requirement will be discussed under the section on repressive and 
authoritarian states.
16  https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2021/facebook-has-an-apparent-double-standard-over-covid-
19-misinformation-in-brazil-researchers-say/ accessed 19 March 2021; https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/
equilibrioesaude/2021/03/bolsonaro-violou-regras-do-facebook-para-covid-ao-menos-29-vezes-em-2021-
mas-nao-foi-punido.shtml accessed 19 March 2021.
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of Donald Trump and many of his supporters, sparking a global debate over “deplatforming”.17 
However, similar actions are lacking in countries like India where political parties have 
engaged in coordinated campaign manipulations. Taking note of this vast unevenness, UN 
entities should mobilize political and diplomatic tools to facilitate the implementation of best 
platform governance practices across Member States, drawing lessons from some of the latest 
regulations and policy proposals. 
The two landmark digital legislations proposed by the European Union in December 2020—
the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital markets Act (DMA)—are noteworthy for some of 
the far-reaching policy directions they have enunciated in relation to “illegal content” (defined 
according to Union or Member State legislations). Also hailed as the “new constitution for 
the internet”,18 the proposed legislations have touched up several critical areas for platform 
governance, highlighting the need for institutional safeguards, due diligence, and procedural 
clarity for content moderation and free speech. While continuing to exempt platforms from 
liabilities for illegal content posted by users (similar to the US legislations), the proposed 
legislations nonetheless hold the platforms liable if they do not act with a specified timeframe 
to remove access to such content once they receive notices or complaints. Beyond content 
takedowns, the regulation allows for other substantive policy measures. Some of these 
proposed measures are directly relevant in addressing the problem of global unevenness in 
platform governance and anchoring such efforts to legitimate public interest objectives:
 ► Principle of proportionality: Implementing the principle of proportionality, the DSA 
has proposed more severe obligations on “very large platforms” defined as “systemic 
platforms”19 that have more than 45 million users in the EU region. The obligations are 
proportionately distributed based on the size and nature of services.20 The obligations 
on systemic platforms include strict transparency standards that require them to publish 
reports to inform policymakers, users, regulators, and researchers about how they curate, 
moderate, categorize and remove online content. UN entities should lobby for similar 
17  Guo, E. 2021. Deplatforming Trump will work, even if it won’t solve everything. MIT Technology Review, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/08/1015956/twitter-bans-trump-deplatforming/ accessed 19 
March 2021.
18  https://www.golem.de/news/digitale-dienste-gesetz-das-neue-grundgesetz-fuer-die-
internetwirtschaft-2012-152892.html accessed 13 February 2021.
19  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package accessed 15 February 2021.
20  The regulation highlights a nested structure—"internet intermediary service providers” refer to the whole 
range of intermediary services while hosting services are part of this larger set, and online networks 
a subset of hosting services. The regulation “sets out basic obligations applicable to all providers of 
intermediary services, as well as additional obligations for providers of hosting services, and more 
specifically, online platforms and very large online platforms”. Additional obligations are not applied to 
what the Union has defined as “micro or small enterprises” to “avoid disproportionate burdens”  https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN
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additional obligations on global social media corporations that operate in Member States 
although policy measures should not ignore smaller, domestic players.21
 ► Removal of illegal content: the DSA requires internet service providers to act “expeditiously 
to remove or to disable access to that content...upon obtaining actual knowledge or 
awareness of illegal content”. This knowledge could come from its own investigations or 
notices submitted by individuals or entities recognized by the regulation.
 ► Independent regulator and fines: the DSA’s proposal to establish a strong and autonomous 
European regulator to oversee and implement the legislations comes armed with heavy 
dissuasive fines (as high as 6 per cent of the annual income or turnover of the internet 
service provider). 
 ► Online advertising: Recognizing that online advertising can further amplify illegal and 
harmful content, the DSA regulation has mandated online platforms to maintain archives 
of advertisements they publish and “ensure that the recipients of the service have certain 
individualized information necessary for them to understand when and on whose behalf 
the advertisement is displayed.22 In addition, companies are obliged to provide recipients 
of the service with information on the “main parameters used for determining that specific 
advertising is to be displayed to them, providing meaningful explanations of the logic used 
to that end, including when this is based on profiling.”23 This policy measure can be another 
rallying point for UN entities to tackle targeted and computational political campaigns 
and “dark ads”24 that run on divisive and hate-filled agendas—a scenario that has gained 
growing salience on a global scale.25Although companies like Facebook are publishing 
data on advertisements in publicly accessible formats, there is still vast unevenness both 
geographically and among social media platforms. 
 ► Recommender systems:  the DSA places additional regulatory controls on algorithmically 
mediated recommender systems of platforms. Article 29 of the regulation states that the 
platforms “should clearly present the main parameters for such recommender systems in an 
21  See the discussion under “Gray zones, fringe actors and smaller platforms”.
22  The US has proposed the Honest Ads Act (2017). https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/1989  accessed 15 February 2021.
23  Public policy commentators have noted that the proposed EU legislations need to place more restrictions 
on micro-targeted “hyper-invasive surveillance advertising”, urging for stricter regulations with e-privacy 
mandates on online advertising. https://edri.org/our-work/eu-attempt-to-regulate-big-tech/ accessed 10 
February, 2021.
24  In the Brexit referendum and 2016 U.S. election, for instance, reports have revealed the circulation of 
“dark ads” on social media platforms. These advertisements had no “accompanying information about 
their funding or why they were targeted at users.” https://time.com/5921760/europe-digital-services-act-
big-tech/ accessed 13 February 2021.
25  Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2017). Troops, trolls, and troublemakers: A global inventory of organized 
social media manipulation (Working Paper 2017.12). Project on Computational Propaganda, University of 
Oxford.
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easily comprehensible manner to ensure that the recipients understand how information 
is prioritized for them. They should also ensure that the recipients enjoy alternative 
options for the main parameters, including options that are not based on profiling of the 
recipient.”  This is yet another important policy measure to tackle algorithmically mediated 
radicalization and its potential to create aggressive ideological hate groups primed with 
regular exposure to information that deepens their bias. 
 ► Notices and trusted flaggers: the DSA regulation requires providers of internet hosting 
services to implement “user-friendly notice and action mechanisms” and internal 
complaint handling systems through which users can report violations. Platforms in turn 
are obligated to inform the user (whose content has been removed) of its decision, the 
reasons for its decision, and available redressal possibilities to contest the decision. To 
protect against misuse of this provision, the regulation (Article 20) allows online platforms 
to “suspend, for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning, the 
processing of notices and complaints…by individuals or entities or by complainants that 
frequently submit notices or complaints that are manifestly unfounded.” Through the 
category of “trusted flaggers”, the regulation proposes to expedite this process for greater 
public good. Online platforms are obligated to process and decide on the notices submitted 
by trusted flaggers “on priority and without delay”. Trusted flagger status is “awarded to 
entities and not individuals that have demonstrated…that they have particular expertise 
and competence in tackling illegal content, that they represent collective interests and that 
they work in a diligent and objective manner.” UN entities should not only advocate for this 
policy proposal globally but can also mediate in identifying trusted flaggers within Member 
States. 
 ► Independent dispute settlement bodies: To protect against indiscriminate takedowns and 
infringement of freedom of expression, the DSA (Article 18) has proposed to set up certified 
dispute settlement bodies to which online users can lodge complaints and seek redressal, 
after failing to find redressal through platforms’ internal complaint procedures. 
 ► Risk mitigation: Placing further expectations on very large platforms, the DSA (Article 26) 
requires them to implement risk mitigation measures following an assessment of systemic 
risks that arise from coordinated manipulation of the platform’s service and intentional 
sabotage. Platforms are expected to “enhance or…adapt.. the design and functioning of 
their content moderation, algorithmic recommender systems and online interfaces. They 
may also include corrective measures, such as discontinuing advertising revenue for specific 
content, or other actions, such as improving the visibility of authoritative information 
sources.” Platforms are also encouraged to “initiate or increase cooperation with trusted 
flaggers, organize training sessions and exchanges with trusted flagger organizations, and 
cooperate with other service providers, including by initiating or joining existing codes 
of conduct or other self-regulatory measures.” Proactive measures envisaged by the DSA 
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provide yet another substantive area for policy advocacy for UN entities. 
 ► Transparency reports: the DSA (Articles 13, 23) requires internet service providers (except 
micro-or small enterprises) to annually report on “the content moderation they engage 
in, including the measures taken as a result of the application and enforcement of their 
terms of conditions”. It is worth noting that companies have been responding to similar 
requirements in the United States. In November 2020, Facebook disclosed the extent of 
hate speech that is shared on its platform, revealing that “out of every 10,000 content views 
in the third quarter, 10 to 11 included hate speech.”26 However, civil rights organization Anti-
Defamation League, one of the groups that led the advertisement boycott against Facebook 
in the summer of 2020, argued that the report did not provide information on the total 
number of hate speech instances that users had flagged and to what extent the company 
had taken action on these reports.27 UN entities should address uneven application of this 
requirement globally, placing pressure on global social media corporations to maintain 
similar standards across locations where they operate.   
 ► Independent auditing: the DSA requires platforms to ensure independent expert verification 
and provide “all relevant data necessary to perform the audit properly.” Although companies 
like Facebook have implemented such measures in the US context,28 there are huge gaps in 
the global wide application of similar practices. 
 ► Code of conduct: There have been several efforts at drawing a voluntary code of conduct 
for social media companies, but the DSA has tightened the regulatory norm by placing 
obligations on very large online platforms to comply with a code of conduct and any 
refusal to participate in the application of the code of conduct invites scrutiny for possible 
infringement of obligations laid down by the regulation.29 This is yet another area for policy 
advocacy for UN entities.
 ► Research and access: Highlighting the value of research, the DSA has proposed a 
framework that compels large online platforms to provide data access to vetted researchers. 
Considering the opaque operations of social media companies and their heavy-handed 
approach to research requests and blocking of API access,30 UN entities should advance this 
26  https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-facebook-content/facebook-offers-up-first-ever-estimate-of-hate-
speech-prevalence-on-its-platform-idINKBN27Z2QY accessed 16 February 2021.
27  https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-facebook-content/facebook-offers-up-first-ever-estimate-of-hate-
speech-prevalence-on-its-platform-idINKBN27Z2QY accessed 16 February 2021.
28  See Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit 2020, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-
Audit-Final-Report.pdf accessed 17 February 2021.
29  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN.  
These stricter measures have followed from criticism of non-compliance and lack of standardized and 
transparent procedures in the implementation of the Code of Conduct. 
30  Freelon, D., & Wells, C. (2020). Disinformation as political communication. Political Communication, 
37(2), 145–156.
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policy objective and facilitate critical research through greater data access.31  
In addition, towards evolving more even and equitable platform governance practices, two 
more areas require urgent action:
 ► Corporate practices for content moderation: Social media companies—especially the 
workforce that directly deal with online speech moderation—should be inducted into 
and socialized within the discursive institution of journalism. A necessary step is to urge 
social media companies to equip content moderators with literacy around the “cognitive 
toolkit”32 and conventions of journalism that place normative emphasis on truth telling for 
public good. Social media companies should be pressed to position content moderators 
as meaningful agents performing a publicly relevant role rather than treating them as 
“low-status” workers in their organizational hierarchies.33 Companies should organize or 
enhance existing training programs for content moderators by inviting critical scholars 
and CSOs/NGOs so that moderators develop a keen understanding of the various political, 
cultural and social issues that shape online extreme speech within national or local 
contexts. Large social media companies have engaged academic researchers in an ad hoc 
manner, and sometimes, such engagements hinge upon the commitment and enterprise 
of individual executives stationed at different country level offices rather than a rigorous 
company-wide policy applied across all the locations.  Importantly, companies should also 
put in place sufficient measures to mitigate psychological and emotional stress associated 
with content moderation work by providing on-the-floor counseling support and fair 
working conditions.34 Although social media giants such as Facebook and YouTube have 
regularly issued public statements to affirm their commitment towards protecting content 
moderators from psychological stress, these measures have not been uniform, while smaller 
platforms, on the other hand, have maneuvered local connections to evade the regulatory 
gaze on this issue. Indian media reports, for instance, have highlighted that content 
moderators working for smaller platforms like TikTok (banned in India since 2020), LIKEE 
31  The DSA’s proposed framework requires that “access to data…should be proportionate and appropriately 
protect the rights and legitimate interests, including trade secrets and other confidential information, of 
the platform and any other parties concerned, including the recipients of the service.”
32  Hanitzch, T. et al. (2019). Journalistic culture in a global context: A conceptual map. In Worlds of 
Journalism: Journalistic Cultures Around the Globe (pp. 23–45). New York: Columbia University Press. p. 
33.
33  Roberts, S. T. (2019). Behind the Screen: Content Modreation in the Shadows of Social Media. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
34  A report published by Forbes notes that, “Facebook employs about 15,000 content moderators directly or 
indirectly. If they have three million posts to moderate each day, that’s 200 per person: 25 each and every 
hour in an eight-hour shift. That’s under 150 seconds to decide if a post meets or violates community 
standards”. https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000-facebook-content-
moderation-mistakes-daily-report-says/?sh=37b95ce54d03 accessed 24 November 2020.
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and Bigo Live, which are newly popular for their short and live video sharing, do not have the 
“luxuries like counsellors”.35  In addition to addressing grossly inadequate support systems 
available for content moderating labor, a further step would be to urge companies to end 
opaque and exploitative contractual arrangements with third party vendors, and instead 
recruit content moderators as regular employees with protections and perks comparable to 
those extended to any other technology service.36 These recommended measures recognize 
that robust content moderation practices can follow only when organizational processes 
and structures behind them are fair and robust. 
 ► Targeting hate influencers online with positive narratives: UN entities, with their vast 
networks of local units, should provide context sensitive positive narratives to global social 
media companies directly to target hate influencers. Such measures can complement 
and balance other restrictive, securitized approaches such as data forensics for content 
takedowns and blocking problematic social media accounts.  
Simultaneously, UN entities should be alert on the potentialities of emerging technological 
developments such as open-source protocols of “alternative social media” that have promised 
greater community autonomy in contrast to corporate social media’s “layers of abstraction 
and centralization that eliminate users from decision-making processes”.37 Mastodon, a 
decentralized microblogging system, for instance, has developed a social media architecture 
that offers more user control over content and data, but the actual political implications of 
their development remain to be seen.
35  https://www.livemint.com/news/india/inside-the-world-of-india-s-content-mods-11584543074609.html 
accessed 24 November 2020.
36  A study published by the NYU Stern Centre for Business and Human Rights calls for ending outsourcing 
in content moderation activities, urging Facebook to provide secure employment to content 
moderators and bring content moderation practices under the oversight of experienced executives. 
See https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/faculty-research/who-moderates-social-media-
giants-call-end-outsourcing Following mounting public pressure, Facebook agreed in principle in May 
2020 to “pay US$52 million to compensate current and former content moderators who developed 




5eTTckJljgJoyczATpS accessed 24 November 2020). However, media reports in countries like India that 
houses several outsourcing centers for the global tech companies pointed out that the lawsuit covered 
only people who have worked for Facebook through third-party vendors in the US, leaving out vendors 
spread around the globe (estimated to be 11,250 people). https://www.deccanchronicle.com/technology/
in-other-news/160520/why-india-needs-to-be-the-centre-for-content-moderation-reform.html accessed 
24 November 2020.
37  Zulli, D., Liu, M., and Gehl, R. (2020). Rethinking the ‘social’ in social media: Insights into topology, 
abstraction, and scale on the Mastodon social network. New Media & Society, 22(7): 1188–1205.
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Connection
Another key intervention on a global scale (and moving down, on the national and community 
levels) would be to connect existing critical stakeholder communities to leverage, incubate, 
curate and expand on best practices, coping strategies, technologies, and countertactics to 
online extreme speech. Some examples are the shared repositories of fact checking tools 
that different organizations have created to help each other. These initiatives are laudable 
but access to such repositories is constrained by language (since these tend to be largely in 
English) as well as expected technological knowledge and internet access. 
Addressing language and other constraints, the action frame of “connection” should be 
strengthened across diverse projects and involved groups. This action frame can not only 
offer ways to build and share a repository of successful initiatives, tools, and experiences, 
but they also help in addressing critical systemic issues such as bias and lack of transparency 
in AI-assisted content moderation and filtering, and corporate control over determining 
hateful language. Below is a long description of the AI4Dignity38 project as an illustrative case 
for designing and implementing measures that can operationalize the human-in-the-loop 
principle by facilitating connections between academic researchers from different disciplines 
and critical communities such as fact checkers on a global level.
 
AI4Dignity: Collaborative AI Counters Hate
38  AI4Dignity project (2021–2022) is funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement number 957442). This author 
is the principal investigator of the project. Other members include Hinrich Scheutze, Elonnai Hickok, 
Antonis Maronikolakis, Axel Wisiorek, Laura Csuka and Leah Nann. 
Responding to the challenge of combating 
online hate, governments and companies 
have increasingly turned to AI as a tool that 
can detect, decelerate, and remove online 
extreme speech. AI deployment is explored in 
several areas of content moderation: detect-
ing content (flagging, tagging, and labeling); 
evaluating content (blocking and takedowns); 
curating content (recommending, promoting 
or downranking content); and responding to 
content (automated messages and responses 
to detected content). Deployment of AI is 
assumed to bring scalability, reduce costs, 
and decrease human discretion and emo-
tional labor. However, mounting empirical 
evidence attests that such efforts face many 
challenges. 
One of the key challenges is the quality, scope 
and inclusivity of training data sets. 
Several studies have shown that classification 
algorithms are limited by the homogenous 
work forces of technology companies that 
employ disproportionately fewer women and 
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people of color.39 Language-based asymmetries 
and uneven allocation of corporate and state 
resources for extreme speech moderation 
that affects different communities globally 
and within the nation-state are other rea-
sons for quality issues in training datasets. 
The second challenge is the lack of procedur-
al guidelines and frameworks that can bring 
cultural contextualization to these systems. 
There is obviously no catch-all algorithm 
that can work for different contexts. Lack 
of cultural contextualization has resulted in 
false positives and overapplication. In addi-
tion, hate groups have managed to escape 
keyword-based machine detection through 
clever combinations of words, misspellings, 
satire, and coded language. For instance, a 
UN sponsored Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission in Myanmar found 
that, “subtleties in the Myanmar language 
and the use of fables and allegories make 
some potentially dangerous posts difficult 
to detect.”40 The dynamic nature of online 
hate speech—where hateful expressions 
keep changing—adds to the complexity. 
The difficulty of deploying AI-assisted systems 
for content moderation in diverse national, 
39  Noble, S.U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. New York: New York 
University Press.
40  Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. 
Doc.A/HRC/39/CRP.2, September 17, 2018, para 1311.
41  Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of 
Power. New York: Public Affairs.
42  Ed, F. (2017). What Algorithms Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
43  Forlano, L. (2018). Invisible Algorithms, Invisible Politics. Public Books blog, February 2, 2018. https://
www.publicbooks.org/invisible-algorithms-invisible-politics/ accessed 12 January 2020.
linguistic and cultural contexts is further 
compounded by the fact that groups that 
are directly involved in flagging online hate-
speech content at the local and regional levels 
lack the technological tools that can expedite 
and scale up their work, although they come 
with cultural knowledge about what consti-
tutes hateful speech within specific contexts. 
Although these challenges are widely ac-
knowledged, corporate imaginations still 
position AI as a tool that can generate best 
decisions, because the inherently “neutral” 
machine-learning model is presumed to only 
become more robust, training itself with more 
and more data, in the onward march towards 
perfecting what Silicon Valley “high priests” 
ambitiously define as “social physics.”41 This 
utopian vision of AI conceals the materialities 
and politics behind AI technologies. As Ed 
Finn writes, “there is no such thing as ‘just 
code’.”42 Algorithms are always the “product 
of social, technical, and political decisions 
and negotiations” that occur throughout 
their development and implementation.43 
The process of choosing and labeling infor-
mation that feeds the “machine” is never 
neutral. Offering one way to address this 
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challenge, AI4Dignity is implementing a 
community-based approach by involving 
fact checkers as critical intermediaries. 
Without doubt, fact checkers are already 
overburdened with verification related tasks, 
but flagging extreme speech could be a critical 
subsidiary to their core activities. Moreover, 
for fact checkers, this collaboration also offers 
the means to foreground their own grievances 
as a target community of extreme speech. Our 
interactions with independent fact checkers 
have shown how their inboxes are filled with 
hateful messages because their public role 
in verification invariably upsets groups that 
seek to (re)shape public discourse for exclu-
sionary ideologies. By involving fact checkers, 
AI4Dignity aims to draw upon the professional 
competence of a relatively independent group 
of experts who are confronted with extreme 
speech both as part of the data they sieve 
for disinformation and as targets of extreme 
speech. In this way, it is creating a mechanism 
where the “close cousin” of disinformation, 
namely extreme speech, is spotted during the 
course of fact checkers’ daily routines, without 
44  Building on existing definitions, this author has developed a model for three categories of extreme speech 
for annotation: derogatory extreme speech, exclusionary extreme speech, and dangerous speech. Fact 
checkers are requested to label the passages (ranging from the minimum string of words that comprises 
a meaningful unit in a particular language) to about six to seven sentences under these three categories. 
Derogatory extreme speech refers to expressions that do not conform to accepted norms of civility within 
specific regional/local/national contexts and targets people/groups based on racialized categories or 
protected characteristics (ethnicity, national origin, caste, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender, 
language group) or others (state, media, politicians). It includes derogatory expressions not only about 
people but also about abstract categories/concepts that they identify targeted groups with. It includes 
varieties of expressions that are considered within specific social-cultural-political contexts as “the 
irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome, and the provocative, as long as 
such speech did not tend to provoke violence” or amounted to implied or direct call for exclusion of target 
groups. The cited passage comes from Redmond Bate vs Director of Public Prosecutions before the Lord 
Justice Sedley and Justice Collins on July 23, 1999; The Times, July 28, 1999. Exclusionary extreme speech 
Expressions that call for or implies excluding historically disadvantaged and vulnerable people/groups 
from the “in-group” based on national origin, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, racialized 
interrupting their everyday activities as much 
as possible. 
Building spaces of direct dialogue and collab-
oration between AI developers and relatively 
independent fact checkers who are not part 
of large media corporations, political party 
machineris or social media companies is a 
key component of AI4Dignity. Furthermore, 
this dialogue has involved ethnographers 
specialized in particular regions in devel-
oping the labels and verifying the datasets. 
A key activity of AI4Dignity is “Counterathon”: 
a marathon of coding to counter online 
extreme speech. During the event, AI/NLP 
(natural language processing) developers and 
independent fact checkers will work in small 
national teams overseen by ethnographers. 
A series of interactions between the research 
team and fact checkers and annotated passages 
that fact checkers will upload before the event 
have provided the preliminary groundwork for 
the NLP models to undergo further iterations 
and modifications during Counterathon.44 
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Through a facilitated triangulation between 
fact checkers, AI developers and ethnogra-
phers, the project is developing a replicable 
process model that can create collaborative 
spaces beyond the purview of global corpo-
rations. This process model aims to stabilize 
a more encompassing collaborative structure 
in which the “hybrid” models of human-ma-
chine filters are able to incorporate dynamic 
reciprocity between critical communities. 
The AI4Dignity toolbox will provide guide-
lines to organize similar events and replicate 
the model at different locations and on differ-
ent scales (local, national and subnational/
regional). 
                   Figure 1: AI4Dignity process model
categories, language or religious affiliation. These expressions incite discrimination, abhorrence and 
delegitimization of targeted groups. The label does not apply to abstract ideas, ideologies or institutions, 
except when there are reasonable grounds to believe that attacks against abstract ideas/ideologies/
institutions amount to a call for/imply exclusion of vulnerable groups associated with these categories. 
Dangerous speech, developed by Benesch (2012), refers to expressions that have reasonable chances to 
trigger /catalyze harm and violence against target groups (including ostracism, segregation, deportation, 
and genocide). Benesch, S. (2012). Dangerous speech: A proposal to prevent group violence. New York: 
World Policy Institute.
45  A policy brief from the AI4Dignity project is available at https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76087/1/
AI4Dignity-AI_Extreme_Speech_Policy_Brief.pdf
Extreme speech databases that are generated 
during the pilot Counterathon event and 
further contributions will contribute towards 
research analysis of extreme speech patterns 
and targets.45  
Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram for 
the collaborative community-based clas-
sification approach, outlining the process 
model for advocacy and implementation at 
various levels, and the resulting decentralized 
extreme speech datasets as resources for evi-
dence-based policymaking.
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This strategy paper urges UN entities to facilitate and fund similar collaborative and curated 
dialogue spaces with the twin objectives of bringing inclusive datasets to AI models and 
developing context sensitive human-machine hybrid models. Alongside fact checkers, such 
initiatives could include other critical communities such as
• online comedians
• anti-hate advocacy groups
• grassroots digital influencers and
• independent journalists
who are active in promoting social justice, resisting repressive states and advocating for 
inclusive societies. Like fact checkers, these communities are also often the targets of hateful 
messages in exclusionary populist milieus46 as well as criticalstakeholders for the cultural 
knowledge they possess about extreme speech. 
In selecting participating organizations, a basic benchmark for “relative autonomy”—in terms 
of ensuring that they are not part of any political party apparatus or full-time contractors/
employees of social media companies—is important because there are growing trends to 
politicize fact checking initiatives by forcing fact checkers to fall in line or funding them to 
toe the party line, or by hijacking and appropriating the very word “fact check” for partisan 
gains.47
Further benchmarks in selecting participants would include representation of diverse 
linguistic communities, including low resource languages. UN reports have noted that “… in 
contexts where multiple local languages are used, the UN may not have sufficient capacities 
to monitor hate speech practices comprehensively. This will add difficulties to UN’s work 
if it does not have the right language skillsets. The use of technology tools such as Natural 
Language Processing for low resource languages may help mitigate this challenge.”48 The 
46  See https://rsf.org/en/news/fact checkers-harassed-social-networks for the Reporters without Borders 
report on harassment of fact checkers in Brazil, accessed 19 February 2021.
47  In India, fact checking as a growing civil society and business enterprise is showing susceptibility to 
political and ideological pressure while independent groups continue to assert their autonomy. A large 
fact checking group, OpIndia, for instance, has declared openly that they do not claim to be “ideologically 
neutral”, and that they will “continue to be right-leaning” (Sharma, 2018). In the UK, media have reported 
the controversies surrounding the conservative party renaming their Twitter account as “Factcheck UK”. 
In Nigeria, online digital influencers working for political parties describe themselves as “fact checking” 
opponents and not fake news peddlers. See https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-18-00-nigerias-propaganda-
secretaries/ accessed 19 March 2021. As opposed to heavily funded fact checking initiatives, grounded, 
community level interventions are critical to fend off ideological heavyweights backed with financial 
power.
48  Joint Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, Department of Peace Operations and Department of 
Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United Nations.
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problem of multiple languages should be addressed on priority by expanding the reach of 
NLP expertise to low resource languages.  
Certification from independent professional associations, where possible (for eg., the 
International Network of Fact Checkers), is yet another safeguard in the selection process. 
Procedural guidelines delineated by the DSA in terms of vetting “trusted flaggers” are relevant 
resources in identifying credible partners (see the section on platform governance). These 
efforts would be a step towards bringing transparency and social accountability to address 
algorithmic bias, “black box” issues and lack of traceability in AI decision making, as well as 
technology gaps in extreme speech detection on a global scale.49  
COUNTRY LEVEL INTERVENTIONS
*Key action frames: specific mix based on the national media ecosystem*
Arguably, country level interventions present the most vexing challenge since any list of 
recommended measures, however dynamic and evolving, cannot be applied uniformly across 
different countries. Despite the global flow of online content, the influence of regulatory 
frameworks, legislations, technological infrastructures, media systems, political cultures, 
linguistic worlds and historical patterns of power precipitate significantly at the national level, 
defying assumptions that 21st century globalization has eroded the power of the nation-state. 
Tailoring a mix of measures for online extreme speech requires keen attention to the vast 
variation in political, cultural and media systems that are institutionalized or consolidated at 
the national level. This challenge could be tackled on two levels. As a longer-term strategy, a 
mix of action frames can be delineated after mapping the countries in terms of their “media 
ecosystems” characterized by structures of power that have stabilized over time and shifting 
processes of change. This analysis should draw upon comparative research on media systems50 
and journalism cultures51 as well as “media development indicators” developed by UNESCO.52
49  Admittedly, there are more issues with AI-assisted models such as function creep that results in overreach 
and violation of digital privacy, and growing challenges with multimodal content (audiovisual, mashups, 
memes, coded expressions) that AI systems are less equipped to detect. These challenges should be 
addressed by developing due process guidelines in AI deployment for content moderation.
50  Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2012). Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
51  Hanitzsch et al., 2019.
52  https://en.unesco.org/programme/ipdc/initiatives/mdis accessed 14 February 2021.
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As a near term strategy, the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders 
(available since 2002)53 could be used as a broad indicator to assess the impacts of media 
ecosystems on online extreme speech in different countries. The World Press Freedom Index’s 
questionnaire that now covers 180 countries includes a detailed section on internet enabled 
media and “cyber-harassment”, and is therefore directly relevant for measures around online 
extreme speech.54 These indicators should be weighted in relation to internet freedom reports 
published by independent watchdog groups. 
Internet and press freedom indicators and variations in media ecosystem are critical parameters 
in developing context sensitive platform governance practices and anti-hate initiatives. Based 
on Hallin and Mancini’s model and McCargo’s theory, it is possible to consider at least four 
distinct media ecosystems based on media-politics relationship:55  
 ► Liberal commercialism: This is characterized by commercial media systems with greater 
number of profit-oriented media enterprises and higher degree of professionalization of 
journalism with its own codes of practice. 
 ► Democratic corporatism: This is defined by higher degree of professionalization of 
journalism but also historically strong patterns of party affiliated media. The presence of 
strong public service broadcasting is an important feature. 
 ► Polarized pluralism: Characterized by a “strong prevalence of partisan media, a tendency to 
instrumentalization of media by political and economic elites, frequent state intervention 
and involvement in the media system, lesser development of journalistic professionalism 
and prevalence of clientelism.”56  
 ► Pluralist polyvalence: The media is “situational, with media actors and organizations shifting 
roles from situation to situation, borrowing from different models, and adapting to changing 
[political] conditions”. Informal links between political elites and media elites are common.57
53  https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology#:~:text=How%20the%20index%20is%20
compiled,journalists%20during%20the%20period%20evaluated accessed 14 February 2021
54  There are drawbacks in these surveys, and therefore, media freedom indices serve only as a starting point 
to a thorough analysis of the national media system needed for longer-term engagements. For a critical 
assessment of different media freedom indices, see Schneider, L. (2020) Measuring Global Media Freedom: 
The Media Freedom Analyzer as a New Assessment Tool. Wiesbaden: Springer.
55  This typology needs be finetuned with further research, regularly revised to account for changes, and 
updated with the latest media freedom indices. The typology draws from the comparative media systems 
analysis developed by Hallin and Mancini (2012) based on the structure of media markets, the degree 
and form of political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state. Rather than 
considering these formations as systems with stable structures, it is more fruitful to approach them as 
ecosystems with shifting practices and agency of diverse actors yet embedded within distinctive patterns 
of media-politics relationships that have precipitated over time.
56  Hallin & Mancini 2012, p.279.
57  Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 301. See McCargo, D. (2012). Partisan polyvalance: Characterizing the political 
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It is only by examining distinct dynamics of power in these media ecosystems and their 
shifting patterns over time that most effective policy measures for extreme speech can be 
developed. The above longer-term strategy requires research and phased roll out. This paper 
urges UN entities to support such long-term studies for nuanced measures. At the same 
time, it is important to take note of the three urgent areas for intervention listed below since 
these cross-cutting tendencies are seen, with varying degrees of severity, across diverse media 
ecosystems.
Urgent Priorities
Repressive and authoritarian assaults on online speech
The new millennium decades represent a tumultuous period in history, as the political stunts 
of populist leaders and everyday activities of millions of online users have repowered small 
and spectacular spaces of exclusion. The global wide resurgence of right-wing movements, 
anti-minority and anti-migrant politics in this period reveal a particular precipitation—a 
political formation that has relied predominantly, if not exclusively, on digital channels. The 
liberal approach to hate speech builds on the premise that the state and autonomous civil 
society will uphold democratic values and condemn people who indulge in hateful speech 
through established processes and institutions of democracy. In the last two decades, the self-
declared illiberal and populist authoritarian regimes have unabashedly challenged this logic 
by unleashing a wave of repressive attacks against advocates for inclusive and just societies. 
Such regimes have offered a sense of impunity to dispersed online users spewing hatred 
online. They have also directly or through opaque arrangements enlisted hate speakers and 
deployed bots to peddle exclusionary narratives, toward a promised secure future for those 
they consider as proper citizens. 
Even more, repressive regimes have increasingly resorted to silencing and intimidating 
legitimate voices that have raised demands for justice and dignity by channelizing internet 
enabled media.  They have turned regulatory provisions that require social media platforms 
to share their data, allow inspections and cooperate with authorities for independent audits58 
and similar measures into a weapon to gain control over social media discourses. Turkey’s 
new social media law is one of the latest instances where the regime has imposed advertising 
role of Asian media. In Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World (pp. 201–223). New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
58  For instance, the DSA proposes that the European Commission and the Digital Services Coordinator 
(a newly instituted regulatory authority) “may require access to or reporting of specific data. Such a 
requirement may include, for example, the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought 
about by the platform’s systems, data on the accuracy, functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for 
content moderation, recommender systems or advertising systems, or data on processes and outputs of 
content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this Regulation.”
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bans on social media companies such as Twitter, Pinterest and Periscope for failing to appoint 
a local representative to take down contentious content.59 The regulatory measure to oblige 
social media companies to appoint “compliance officers”—a measure that appears benign and 
progressive in established democracies—has served as a means to clampdown on dissenters 
in these contexts. Scholars have shown that the “[COVID 19] pandemic has only accelerated 
and amplified the effect of the so-called ‘anti-fake-news’ laws on a global level as governments 
from Romania to Botswana emulate scare tactics seen in Singapore and Malaysia.”60 Not only 
do these sweeping rules lack due diligence processes, but they have also widened the ambit 
of control by including online news services and video streaming. Such measures have raised 
concerns about over-censorship and the undermining of end-to-end encryption, reminding 
yet again that EU and other regulations in the West that are cited as “global models” set a 
precedence for stricter controls, but they serve as a double-edged sword and a direct weapon 
of repression in contexts where democratic rights are under attack.
Internet shutdowns are another commonly used repressive tool, often putting entire 
populations under complete online lockdown. For instance, digital rights organizations have 
reported the consequences of severe forms of internet censorship in Iran.61 A study conducted 
by a team of computer scientists at the University of Michigan in 2020 noted “increasing 
censorship activity in more than 100 countries” spanning Sudan, Sri Lanka, Norway, Zimbabwe 
and other countries.62 The study has identified eleven categories of websites facing increasing 
censorship, including websites that contained content related to human rights issues and 
news media.
State complicity in weaponizing digital technologies against vulnerable and minoritized 
populations has emerged as another grave concern. If facial recognition and “emotion 
recognition” have become the new tools in the far-reaching infrastructures of state 
surveillance and repressive clampdown on resistance in countries like China,63 the state 
59  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/19/turkey-slaps-advertising-ban-on-twitter-with-new-social-
media-law accessed 16 February 2021.
60  Ong, J. (2021). Southeast Asia’s information crisis: Where the state is the biggest bad actor and regulation 
is a bad word. SSRC Items.  https://items.ssrc.org/disinformation-democracy-and-conflict-prevention/
southeast-asias-disinformation-crisis-where-the-state-is-the-biggest-bad-actor-and-regulation-is-a-bad-
word/ accessed 20 February 2021.
61  https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38315/The-National-internet-AR-KA-final.pdf accessed 
4 March 2021.
62 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372297.3417883  accessed 5 April 2021
63  In a detailed study on China’s application of behavior recognition technologies, British digital rights 
watchdog Article 19 has shown that behavior recognition applications are deployed to cover a wide 
breadth of governance including credit worthiness, criminal behavior as well as student attentiveness 
inside the classroom. https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ER-Tech-China-Report.pdf 
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has been conducting a long-standing campaign of violence and extreme speech against the 
Rohingya minorities in Myanmar, using state owned media and internet platforms to further 
perpetrate this aggression.64  
In such situations, UN entities should partner with civil society monitoring groups and 
global digital rights organizations to increase policy pressure and raise awareness, aside from 
engaging with governments directly. In the EU context, scholars have argued that European 
institutions and Member States “should be obliged by EU law to withdraw funding provided to 
and prohibit political coalition with political parties and other organisations whose members 
repeatedly represent views that are irreconcilable with the values of the European Union, 
provided that the party or other entity fails to sanction this.”65 UN entities should strengthen 
similar policy and diplomatic tools for global monitoring and regulatory action in Member 
States, including capacity building of key State actors,66 monitoring the deployment of AI-
assisted technologies, and empowering CSOs and research networks to strengthen “lobby 
initiatives that can maneuver around repressive regimes”. 67 
A significant step is to enlist the support of social media companies in scenarios of state 
repression, extralegal intimidation, and political misuse of legal provisions. Interestingly, in 
Southeast Asia, studies have found that a few global social media companies were active in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives for election integrity at a time when state led targeted assaults 
against regime critical voices continued apace.68 In countries like India, corporate actions 
against extreme speech have vacillated between platforms’ efforts to hold on to their “global 
standards” in hate speech policies and direct complicity in the ideological politics of the 
ruling regime.69 Often shaped by the commitments, prudence, and political leanings of local 
level executives (as pointed out earlier), corporate responsiveness has been ambivalent and 
accessed 28 January 2021.
64  Lee, R. (2019). Extreme speech in Myanmar: The role of state media in teh Rohingya forced migration 
crisis. International Journal of Communication, 13, 3203–3224.
65  Bayer, J., & Bárd, P. (2020). Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evalution of online content 
regulation approaches. Brussels: Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
European Parliament, p. 13
66  The UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (September 2020) has highlighted capacity building 
for key State actors, “notably judges, judicial personnel (such as prosecutors and court officials), law 
enforcement agents and members of the security forces on international human rights norms and 
standards relating to hate speech, especially the standard of incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence that amounts to a criminal offence (as indicated in the Rabat Plan of Action).”
67  Ong, 2021.
68  Ong, 2021.
69  https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-hate-speech-india-politics-muslim-hindu-modi-
zuckerberg-11597423346 accessed 16 February 2021.
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uncertain. Recent news reports in India have cited internet whistleblowers who have exposed 
Facebook’s “double standard” in enforcing content takedown policies, and how the company 
has been lenient towards fake accounts and fake engagement that are backed by powerful 
politicians.70 Following international outcry, Facebook banned Myanmar’s commander-in-
chief and military officials from its platform after admitting it was “too slow” to respond to the 
concerns of UN officials and human rights advocates.71 Twitter took a similar action against 
Donald Trump in the US, while also raising questions about corporate veto power.  
In cases of coordinated attacks or authoritarian controls over platform regulations, and 
dramatic turmoil when companies feel the pressure to take swift actions at the cost of due 
diligence processes, UN entities should apply pressure on, and if necessary, guide social 
media companies to comply with global standards of content moderation and human rights 
protection by offering procedural clarity around escalation protocols and decision making. 
A significant step is to recognize that “individualized and user-focused enforcement models” 
that social media companies have adopted are not sufficient under repressive conditions.72 
In Myanmar, for instance, government sponsored genocide campaign made hateful speech 
against the Rohingya Muslims so widespread and pervasive that taking down content based 
on “individual instances of hate speech” would be neither feasible nor effective.73 In cases 
of “pervasive hate directed to vulnerable populations”, policies should draw guidance from 
“both international human rights law and international law on remedies” and encourage 
companies to “proactively police their networks for coordinated speech campaigns against 
vulnerable groups, in conditions that might indicate such speech could contribute to 
impunity for violence”74 (see also the point on risk mitigation under “platform governance”). 
In addition, design features of social media companies that encourage polarized content 
through algorithmic mediations should be brought into periodic scrutiny. An institutionalized 
global structure to regularly convene social media companies to address repressive assaults 
on online speech will be a significant step towards addressing upheavals that unfold at the 
national levels. Convening different social media companies is especially critical during the 
elections since disinformation campaigns funded by resource rich political parties have begun 
to increasingly adopt cross-platform manipulation tactics. These measures should go hand in 
70  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/apr/15/facebook-india-bjp-fake-accounts?CMP=Share_
iOSApp_Other accessed 22 April 2021.
71  Land, M. K. and Hamilton, R. L. (2020). Beyond Takedown: Expanding the toolkit for responding to 
online hate. In Dojcinovic, P. (ed.) Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law: From Cognition to 
Criminality. London: Routledge. Also available as Research Paper No. 2020-11  at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3514234.
72  Land & Hamilton, 2020, p. 2.
73  Land & Hamilton, 2020, p. 5.
74  Land & Hamilton, 2020, p. 3
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hand with community level and creative actions against online hate listed in the next section. 
In summary
Measures to address repressive attacks against online speech and coordinated hate 
campaigns:
• Applying pressure on, and if neces-
sary, guiding social media companies 
to comply with global standards of 
content moderation and human rights 
protection by offering procedural clar-
ity around escalation protocols and 
decision making. 
• An institutionalized global structure to 
regularly convene social media compa-
nies to address repressive assaults on 
online speech. 
• Partnering with civil society monitor-
ing groups and global digital rights 
organizations for awareness raising and 
to increase policy pressure for platform 
governance 
• Capacity building of key State actors 
such as judges and the judicial per-
sonnel to sensitize them about sound 
practices of platform governance 
• Monitoring the emulation of stricter 
regulatory models implemented in 
developed economies with stable de-
mocracies for repressive purposes in 
other national contexts
• Monitoring the deployment of AI-
assisted technologies by state actors
Gray zones, fringe actors and smaller/domestic platforms
Political manipulation of online discourse through algorithmic and computational affordances 
has become the new face of electoral propaganda globally, but especially in the global South, 
partisan politics has spawned a breeding shadow industry that operates through gray practices 
of clickbait operators, hired influencers, and loosely knit networks of dispersed amplifiers 
who are drawn into precarious and informal labor arrangements crafted by ambitious 
mediators. In several countries, political actors and ruling governments are directly engaging 
and sponsoring such practices. 
In India, a significant part of such arrangements is is carried out by the “unofficial” wings of 
the political party campaign systems, which in turn attach to the “official” party structure 
through “third party pages” and opaque arrangements for “service delivery” (euphemism for 
manipulating online discourses). Among other things, these “unofficial” and dispersed networks 
are encouraged to “innovate” on campaign content both in terms of divisive messaging and 
disinformation. Lately, these gray zones have gone mainstream by synchronizing messaging 
across YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms, and relaying open threats 
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to independent media and civil society activists. Heavily funded campaigns have engaged 
transnational data analytics expertise as well as a motley mix of domestic players who present 
themselves as “politically agnostic” digital consultants and promise “data-tested solutions” 
of tracking and calibrating voter sentiments for electoral success. The landscape of political 
extreme speech therefore has a wide range of actors—precarious business entrepreneurs who 
strive to make a livelihood with petty promotional work to ideologically motivated volunteers 
who expect no monetary compensation to self-styled professional entities that have branched 
out from business process outsourcing (BPO) and the Information Technology industry 
by spotting “data tested” digital influence as the next big business opportunity.75 These 
arrangements have augmented the conditions for political actors to peddle politically expedient 
and ideologically driven online vitriol. Studies have gathered evidence for the ways in which 
the ruling right-wing political party exploited social media narratives by using thousands 
of WhatsApp groups with dispersed volunteers and “loosely affiliated online supporters” to 
engage in ‘trending’ campaign friendly hashtags on Twitter.76 Through this “cross-platform 
media manipulation” tactic, “hundreds of trends were fabricated” during the elections.77 These 
trends were later picked by other media outlets leading to amplification of the ruling party’s 
campaign line. It is important to stress that such cross-platform manipulations necessitate 
simultaneous policy actions across different social media companies, and hence convening 
different social media platforms for regular discussions especially during important events 
such as elections (as pointed out in the section) is critical. 
Similar to the variegated scenario of precarious labor, electoral campaign manipulations, 
ideology-led aggression, political opportunism, and commercialization of divisive digital 
content seen in India, studies have exposed “networked disinformation” that functions “as a 
distributed labor of political deception to a hierarchy of digital workers” in the Southeast Asian 
context.78 These studies have revealed that the precarious labor conditions of disinformation 
workers who serve political clients by engaging in project based digital work are characterized 
by “race-to-the-bottom” work arrangements. These “casual workers” are forced to cope with 
stressful work on their own, “in the absence of clear guidelines, psychosocial support systems, 
75  Udupa, S. (2019). India needs a fresh strategy to tackle online extreme speech. 
Economic and Political Weekly Engage. https://www.epw.in/engage/article/
election-2019-india-needs-fresh-strategy-to-tackle-new-digital-tools
76  Jakesch, M., Garimella, K., Eckles, D. and Naaman, M. (2021). #Trend Alert: How a Cross-Platform 
Organization Manipulated Twitter Trends in the Indian General Election. J. ACM XX, XX, Article XXX 
(April 2021), https://doi.org/TBD, p. xxx
77  Jakesch, M., Garimella, K., Eckles, D. and Naaman, M. 2021, p. xxx:2
78  Ong, J. C., & Cabanes, J. V. (2018). Architects of Networked Disinformation: Behind the Scenes of Troll 
Accounts and Fake News Production in the Philippines. www.newtontechfordev.com
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or remuneration”.79 Therefore, the “chief architects of networked disinformation who 
intimidate dissenting voices and craft new prospects for political clients via digital influence 
are themselves precarious architects of precarious labor arrangements in the creative 
industries that make workers vulnerable to slipping to the underground”.80 Precarious and 
opportunistic arrangements that characterize a large number of Rodrigo Duterte’s “trolls” are 
similar to political rivalries that have led to an online army of “AKTrolls” who marshal support 
for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey by flooding online discussions with allegations, counter-
allegations, rumors, and lies.81  
Similar practices of online propaganda and threats to election integrity are widespread in Africa. 
In the Zimbabwean elections in 2018, the two major political parties hired “online warriors”—a 
combination of bots and actual people (paid or volunteering youths)—to manufacture and 
disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp.”82 Sobriquets and name 
calling were rampant on social networking sites. Key presidential contender Nelson Chamisa’s 
followers nicknamed as “Nerorists” and the other contender Mnangagwa’s followers nicknamed 
as “Varakashi” acted as “cyber storm troopers” to push their respective leader’s propaganda.83 
Such tactics included spreading false news and rumor, the most dramatic of which was to raise 
a suspicion that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was biased and lacked the credibility as a 
neutral arbiter. For example, an app bearing the logo of the Commission that invited the users 
to “click to vote” spread rapidly on WhatsApp. “But, responding to the prompt led to a message 
congratulating the user on voting for Mnangagwa, suggesting that the supposedly independent 
electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader”.84 Such messages that enticed the users to click 
innocent looking buttons on handheld gadgets delivered disinformation-based propaganda by 
making use of the mundane and compulsive habits of digital communication.
In Nigeria, studies have shown that online hate speech is a “major driver of election violence”, 
revealing that social media platforms such as WhatsApp have become the new battlegrounds 
for online hate campaigns.85 Especially during election times, false rumors have reached 
79  Ong & Cabanes, 2018, p. 29
80  Ong & Cabanes, 2018.
81  Saka, E. (2018). Social media in turkey as a psace for political battles: AKTrolls and other politically 
motivated trolling. Middle East Critique, 27(2), 161–177.
82  https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-
in-zimbabwe-99402 accessed 3 March 2021.
83  Chibuwe, A. (2020). Social Media and Elections in Zimbabwe: Twitter War between Pro-ZANU-PF and 
Pro-MDC-A Netizens. Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research 46(4): 
7–30.
84  https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-
in-zimbabwe-99402 accessed 3 March 2021.
85  Ezeibe, C. C., & Ikeanyibe, O. M. (2017). Ethnic politics, hate speech and access to political power in 
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the threshold of dangerous speech by “terrifying Nigerian Christians with predictions that 
Muslims plan to kill, rape, and subjugate them”.86 Availability of affordable smart phones 
and messenger applications with light data usage has facilitated the spread of manipulated 
content. For instance, studies have shown how “…in early January, a message entitled ‘Fulani 
War Threat’ circulated on WhatsApp. It was falsely presented as an English translation of a 
pamphlet in Arabic disseminated to mosques in northern Nigeria by a group called FUNAM, 
or the Fulani Nationalist Movement. Staff at the outstanding civil society groups…investigated 
and found that the group doesn’t exist. The fake “pamphlet” that circulated online seemed 
to call on Muslims to boycott the elections, and instead to prepare for holy war.”87 These 
patterns resemble trends in South Asia where religious identity is misused as the key driver of 
politically manipulated digital disinformation. 
Burundi’s political crisis witnessed an increase in the radicalization of the regime since the 
second post-conflict elections in 2010, which escalated especially in 2015 following the late 
President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third presidential term. This led to the growing influence 
of hardline leaders of the ruling party who sought to undermine the Arusha accord— “an 
agreement between Hutu and Tutsi elites in 2000 that put in place an ethnic quota system for 
state institutions, including the army, and established a two-term presidential limit.”88 Social 
media provided a means for communication for citizens and journalists to “to coordinate and 
inform the international community about the conflict”89 in the wake of repressive attacks 
on radios, which were the most common source of information for Burundians prior to 
social media expansion. However, the Nkurunziza regime also sought to gain control over 
social media discourse through orchestrated hateful messaging.  Studies have shown that the 
Twitter account of the presidency’s spokesperson sent out highly charged messages against 
political rivals, dubbing them as “terrorists”, as well as attacking journalists and sending out 
hateful messages against Rwanda.90 At the same time, the presidency’s Twitter account sought 
to maintain the decorum, displaying stability and legitimacy to an international audience.91 
Nigeria. Africa Today, 63(4), 65–83; also https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-18-00-nigerias-propaganda-
secretaries/ accessed 3 March 2021.
86  Benesch, S. (2021). Nigerian politician’s dangerous lives at risk on the eve of 2019 elections. https://
dangerousspeech.org/nigerian-politicians-dangerous-speech-puts-lives-at-risk-on-the-eve-of-2019-
elections/ accessed 3 March 2021
87  Benesch, 2021.
88  https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundi-dangerous-third-term accessed 5 
March 2021
89  Dimitrakopoulu, D., & Boukala, S. (2018). Exploring democracy and violence in Burundi: A multi-
methodical analysis of hegemonic discourses on Twitter. Media, War & Conflict, 11(1), 125–148, p. 126.
90  Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala, 2018.
91  Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala, 2018.
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This kind of “forked tongue” extreme speech—where the country’s leaders offer an image of 
stability by maintaining expected decorum to appease the international community, while 
simultaneously allowing and encouraging their subordinates to spew hatred online—is not 
uncommon in other national scenarios. The 2020 UN report on the strategic assessment 
mission for United Nations engagement in Burundi has observed that the 2020 elections 
in Burundi that led to the change in the leadership were peaceful, but has also cautioned 
that the “prevailing context remains fragile” because of “concerns over the overwhelming 
control of the ruling party…in state institutions” while also noting the “spirit of openness” 
displayed by the Ndayishimiye presidency.92 The report has also noted concerns expressed 
by the opposition and civil society organizations about the “marginalization and silencing of 
independent media”93 and therefore, the evolving role of social media in this changed scenario 
remains to be watched. 
 
Similar to the weaponization of “fake news” as a tool to discredit media and political opponents 
in other parts of Africa, political actors and government officials in South Africa have raked up 
the trope of disinformation for political gains. Worryingly, such manipulations have revived 
the term “Stratcom”—the disbanded propaganda disseminator of the apartheid regimes—as 
ways to discredit political opposition. In conjunction, heavily funded clandestine social media 
propaganda activities have emerged as the new face of the corrupt nexus between the political 
class and crony capitalism. A family of wealthy entrepreneurs who were closely linked to the 
scandal ridden leadership of South African President Jacob Zuma hired the infamous UK PR 
firm Bell Pottinger to spread a racially divisive narrative on social media through bots and 
hired amplifiers. Online troopers flooded social media discussions with distorted news sites, 
shared stories, networks of websites, and retweets to pump up the momentum and tilt the 
discourse in favor of the regime.94  Social media manipulations “worked in tandem” with TV 
and print media owned by the same family. In a bizarre turn of discourse, the paid social media 
campaign of this camp appropriated the left progressive term, “white monopoly capital”, to 
hide its corrupt deals by whipping up a distorted story of racial injustice.95 Although Zuma’s 
regime ended with his resignation in February 2018, following which manipulated social 
media and other propaganda machineries became public, and Bell Pottinger went bankrupt 
92  https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/287/21/PDF/N2028721.pdf?OpenElement, 
pp.4–5 accessed 10 August 2021.
93  https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/287/21/PDF/N2028721.pdf?OpenElement, p. 
10.
94  https://techcentral.co.za/go-inside-guptabot-fake-news-network/76767/ ; https://www.timeslive.co.za/
news/south-africa/2017-09-04-how-the-gupta-campaign-weaponised-social-media/   https://www.
bellingcat.com/news/africa/2017/08/04/guptaleaks-google-analytics/ accessed 2 March 2021.
95  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html  accessed 
2 March 2021.
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soon after, disinformation campaigns among different political rivals still pose a challenge to 
electoral integrity and democratic systems in the country. 
In Saudi Arabia, media reports have revealed that regime supported “troll farms” are tasked with 
targeting dissenting voices. US based media reported that troll farms consist of “‘social media 
specialists’ who operate via group chats in apps like WhatsApp and Telegram, sending them 
lists of people to threaten, insult and intimate; daily tweet quotas to fill; and pro-government 
messages to augment.”96 Similar to disinformation campaigns in Africa, South Asia and East 
Asia, other tactics have involved creating derogatory memes, publishing pornographic images 
to distract from contentious issues and coordinated messaging online. Media accounts 
have also reported that disinformation campaign agents regularly hijack deceased people’s 
social media accounts,97 aside from implanting regime supported spies inside social media 
companies.98 In media interviews, political opponents have alleged that the Saudi regime 
recruited highly reputed global corporate consultancy firms to identify Twitter influencers, 
and later intimidated these influencers to submission or arrested them, forcing some to go 
into exile.99 
Across diverse political scenarios, especially in the global South, an anatomy of vicious 
campaigns that mobilize offensive, hateful, and even dangerous speech to suppress dissent 
or gain voter loyalties reveals that top-down propaganda machineries of political parties or 
ruling regimes ramp up and coordinate closely with bottom-up enthusiasm among volunteers, 
leading to blurred online arenas of sponsored, volunteered and manipulated content. 
The intricate networks and gray zones through which online extreme speech circulates stress 
the need for policy measures that go beyond the focus on social media companies and the 
underlying assumption that regulatory control over big social media companies would solve 
a complex social problem. Community level awareness programs and rapid response systems 
that are sensitive to diverse social conditions of digital hate cultures are critical in addressing 
this challenge (see the next section on community level interventions). 
At the same time, complex realities on the ground require fine tuning platform governance 
policies. The principle of proportionality enunciated by the EU is especially inadequate in this 
96  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/us/politics/saudi-image-campaign-twitter.html accessed 2 March 
2021.
97 https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/2/25/saudi-trolls-hacking-dead-peoples-twitter-to- 
 spread-propaganda accessed 4 March 2021.
98  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/technology/twitter-saudi-arabia-spies.html accessed 4 March 2021.
99  https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?next_url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.washingtonpost.com
%2fopinions%2f2019%2f11%2f14%2fsaudi-spies-hacked-my-phone-tried-stop-my-activism-i-wont-stop-
fighting%2f accessed 4 March 2021.
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regard. the DSA’s (2020) reasoning that fostering the growth of smaller players will provide a 
“level-playing field against providers of illegal content”100 is based on a limited understanding 
of how hateful speech is shared online. Without doubt, large multinational social media 
companies play a major role in amplification, and therefore stricter regulations are warranted. 
However, this should not turn attention away from smaller and niche platforms that have also 
emerged as a breeding ground for hateful subcultures. Ethnographic work has shown that 
hate speakers have used or repurposed smaller platforms by hopping between them to avoid 
the regulatory gaze. Online games, 4Chan, reddit communities and other niche spaces have 
spawned toxic subcultures of hate through digitally native formats of mashups, memes, and 
playful interactional frames. The exodus of right-wing conservatives and Trump supporters 
to Parler, a self-styled free speech platform, after facing the ban on Twitter, offers yet another 
example for the susceptibility or collusion of smaller platforms in exclusionary extreme 
speech. Factcheckers in Brazil have noted a similar migration of right-wing supporters 
to Parler since July 2020, but after Apple and Google blocked the app on their app stores, 
access to the platform has been restricted, forcing several users to retreat to big platforms 
or search for newer ones. Faced with regulatory actions, violent Jihadi groups similarly 
moved to encrypted channels such as Telegram or file-sharing sites such as Pastebin, and the 
extreme right migrated to platforms such as VK.com or Gab.ai.101 A recent study in Europe has 
shown that anti-establishment right-wing celebrities migrated to Telegram and to a “larger 
alternative social media ecology” after being “deplatformed” by major social media companies 
such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for “offenses such as organized hate”.102  The network 
graphs that mapped the connections between right-wing celebrities and platforms revealed 
the prominence of “BitChute (alternative to YouTube), Minds (alternative to Facebook), Gab 
(alternative to Twitter) as well as Telegram (hybrid messaging and broadcasting platform).103 
These realities expose the limits of the proposed EU legislations (DSA and DMA) and the 
premise that breaking open the “centralized platform economy” would solve the problem of 
virality and amplification of online illegal content. The focus therefore should be extended 
to smaller social media platforms that offer niche spaces for online hatred to proliferate 
through regional language friendly applications, platform specific jargons and practices, and 
100  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN
101  It is argued that three formal features of digital hate cultures make them ungovernable: swarm structure 
characterized by decentralized networks; exploitation of inconsistencies in web governance between 
different social media companies as well as between private and government actors that allows hate 
content to migrate when detected; and the use of coded language to evade content moderation Ganesh, 
B. (2018). The ungovernability of digital hate culture. Journal of International Affairs, 71(2), 30–49.
102  Rogers, R. (2020). Deplatforming: Following extreme internet celebrities to Telegram and alternative 
social media. European Journal of Communication, 35(3): 213–229.
103 Rogers, 2020, p. 219.
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lax regulatory attention. This is especially pertinent in the context of the global South. Media 
reports and ethnographic studies carried out by this author have documented that executive of 
smaller companies tend to develop cozy alliances with resource rich political parties or act as 
their proxy representatives, or otherwise, for commercial interests, parade their technologies 
before prospective clients regardless of their political ideologies to win more clients. They also 
seek to profit from platform migration when users, faced with blocking and other content 
moderation actions, leave large social media companies in search of unmoderated platforms. 
While not all of them directly monetize extreme speech, it is important to monitor how they 
are evolving.
Several smaller startups in India provide regional language messaging services, allowing 
their platforms during the election time for partisan messaging and manipulations through 
intricate networks of lobbying and buyouts. For instance, in early 2021, after Twitter took 
action against right-wing hateful speech on its platforms by suspending and blocking many 
handles, and resisted government’s requests to stop publishing posts that were critical of its 
policies, religious majoritarian voices rushed to secure their spot on “Koo App”, a homegrown 
platform founded in March 2020.104 Koo App offers services not only in English but also in 
five Indian languages. Pro-government television channels promoted it as “the best Twitter 
alternative for Indians” and publicized the so-called “trending hashtags” on the new App.105 
French ethical hacker Robert Baptiste raised concerns that the App exposed users to high 
vulnerabilities, as he was able to easily access personal data of users.106 ShareChat is another 
Indian social media startup that currently has 160 million monthly active users and operates 
in 15 Indian languages and not in English. Its opaque content moderation policies and lack of 
regular transparency reports (except during the 2019 general elections in India)107 have raised 
concerns about the risk of unregulated circulation of problematic speech on its platforms. 
In 2020, ShareChat launched the short-video platform “Moj” only days after TikTok was 
banned in India.108 Moj’s terms of use mention that the company “may share [user] information 
with appropriate law enforcement authorities if [they] have good-faith belief that it is 
104  https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/2/17/angry-bird-twitters-india-troubles-give-local-rival-koo-
a-lift; https://time.com/5935003/india-farmers-protests-twitter/; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/
technology/india-twitter.html; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56007451 accessed 3 March 
2021.
105 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-56037901 accessed 3 March 2021.
106 https://www.livemint.com/news/india/french-security-researcher-accuses-koo-of-leaking-user- 
 data-11613022668933.html accessed 3 March 2021.
107  https://medium.com/sharechat/our-efforts-ahead-of-the-general-elections-2019-sharechat-76aa393a4b9a 
accessed 2 March 2021.
108  https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/28/indian-start-up-sharechat-is-one-of-many-looking-to-fill-the-
vacuum-left-by-tiktok-ban.html accessed 2 March 2021.
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reasonably necessary to share your personal data or information in order to comply with any 
legal obligation or any government request.”109 In the current context of tighter regulatory 
controls over online discourse, such explicit terms of use ingrained in homegrown startups 
could contribute to further restrictions on open discussions. In Africa, smaller platforms such 
as IMO, Likee and Vskit are gaining popularity, while more research is awaited to map their 
political impact.110 In Southeast Asia, popular platforms such as Line (in Thailand) and Viber 
(in the Philippines) are shown to be the “cesspools of dis-and misinformation” but they have 
consistently avoided participating in regulatory discussions.111  
Although the EU proposal to require very large platforms (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) to 
open up to competitors with mandatory interoperability is appropriate in the pursuit of anti-
competition policy objectives, this would not be an obvious solution to fix the problem of hateful 
content. This proposal assumes that regulating large platforms and fostering smaller players 
would lead to a scenario where “users could freely choose which social media community they 
would like to be part of—for example depending on their content moderation preferences and 
privacy needs—while still being able to connect with and talk to all of their social friends and 
contacts”. 112 This approach comes with a liberal baggage, and more gravely, the dangers that 
this very marketplace for ideas could provide easy ways for hate mongers to hop between the 
platforms. Even more, political vested interests are likely to invest and drive the market of multiple 
smaller players toward partisan messaging. The proposal for interoperability, in other words, 
should be combined with a host of other measures to address proxy campaigning. In several cases 
of repressive and authoritarian conditions, global corporations with some stable moderation 
practices and resources have been more responsive to implementing safeguards against online 
hate and illegal content than the sundry mix of unregulated platforms that operate in the gray 
zones. Although this strategy raises the risk of framing “corporate capital as an explicit ally in the 
struggle for a just world”,113 the point emphasized here is that the dangers of small platforms that 
are equally as capitalized require some hardheaded policy actions. Such measures should also not 
ignore the potentiality of smaller platforms to enable progressive alternative discourses and user 
autonomy through open-source protocols and low capital ventures.  
Especially where ruling regimes are directly involved in intimidation and disinformation campaign, 
109  https://help.mojapp.in/policies/terms accessed on 4 June 2021.
110  https://www.usiu.ac.ke/assets/image/Kenya_Social_Media_Lanscape_Report_2020.pdf accessed 5 March 
2021
111  Ong, 2021.
112  EDRi. (2020). Platform regulation done right: EDRi position paper on the EU Digital Services Act. Brussels:  
European Digital Rights, p.4.
113  Flood, D. (2019). Responding to ‘Fake News’ in an Era of Hashtag Leftism. Anthropology News, 29 January.
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engaging with large social media platforms would be necessary to implement some pushback 
mechanisms. For instance, in late December 2019, Facebook/Instagram and Twitter announced 
that they suspended accounts for their “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” and “state-backed 
information operations” of Saudi Arabia (Facebook detected a second campaign from UAE and 
Egypt too).114 As a preventive strategy, platforms should also create interfaces that “nudge users 
toward responsible speech choices” and tweak their algorithms to “deprioritize particularly 
extreme or virulent content”.115  
In summary
Measures to address repressive attacks against online speech and coordinated hate 
campaigns:
• Engaging the “Big Tech” is critical but 
policy measures should recognize that 
regulatory control over big social me-
dia companies would not fully solve a 
complex social problem
• Monitoring and supporting compli-
ance to global standards among small-
er platforms and niche internet spaces 
is important because hate speakers 
have used or repurposed smaller plat-
forms by hopping between them to 
avoid the regulatory gaze
• Mobilizing community level awareness 
programs and rapid response systems 
that are sensitive to diverse, country 
specific social conditions of digital 
hate cultures is critical (see more un-
der ‘community level interventions’)
• Convening self-styled political trolls, 
local level politicians, and commer-
cial digital influencers for awareness 
raising activities, and sensitizing them 
about global human rights standards 
and the dangers of digital campaign 
manipulations by sharing the narra-
tives of those who have been severely 
affected by digital hate both locally and 
in other parts of the world is another 
area of intervention
• Where ruling regimes are directly in-
volved in intimidation and disinforma-
tion campaigns, engaging with large 
social media platforms for necessary 
regulatory actions against coordinated 
attacks is necessary. In some cases, big 
social media platforms have participat-
ed in responsible governance efforts 
114  https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/cib-uae-egypt-saudi-arabia/; https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2019/new-disclosures-to-our-archive-of-state-backed-information-operations.html accessed 4 
March 2021.
115  Land, M. K. (2018). Speech duties. The American Journal of International Law Unbound, 112, p. 329.
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more enthusiastically than ruling
governments that are eager to seize
online discourse to advance their own
goals. In cases where regimes are ada-
mant, social media platforms provide
an important gateway for intervention.
Platforms should undertake measures
not only in the liberal democracies
of the West where policy pressure on
content moderation is high but also in
other parts of the world to act against
illegal content and encourage users to
adopt responsible speech practices.
Gender-based abuses 
Gender-based abusive trolling is a particularly virulent form of online extreme speech and 
a disturbing trend that cuts across diverse cultures with vastly different levels of protection 
and opportunities for women and sexual minorities. Publicized in some cases and insidious 
in others, trolling attacks have involved targeting women and LGBTQI+ public figures active 
in politics, social voluntary work or journalism, especially those who are pushing back against 
regressive right-wing discourses. Seeking to delegitimize daring female voices, such abuses 
typically invoke the image of illicit sex and prostitution in proses and sexist epithets that 
sometimes reveal their preset formats. Far from the grounds of veracity, such abuses gain valence 
through repetition and reverberation. Allegations against women public figures for sleeping 
with male politicians are not meant to compete on grounds of truth, but as reverberations 
that could exhaust the targets. This form of abuse can be recognized as “evaluative talk” that 
invokes practices of “verbal obscenity” and emerges from “specific cultural systems of moral 
judgment”. 116  
Digital anonymity is often cited as the reason for such abuses since it is assumed to catalyze 
“deindividuation” with reduced terms of self-evaluation. However, a closer focus on local abuse 
cultures reveals that abusers operate upon local knowledge and it is quite common for victims 
to second guess who the abuser is. Under conditions where abusers feel they have political 
immunity and the backing of the regime, vitriol turns into direct threats that attack social 
and personal security with precise knowledge of the target’s life routines and lifestyles. These 
online messages, for example, would name the child of the woman online commentator and 
the time her child would go to the school on a particular route. Attackers have also threatened 
independent women journalists and political commentators with gangrape and acid attacks, 
often in collusion with political forces on the ground. 
116  Butler, J. (1997). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, p.109.
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In various ways, political extreme speech that comes in the form of gender-based abuse draws 
from a broader online culture of misogyny rampant in online game cultures117  and darker 
niches of internet channels spanning image boards, closed online communities as well as 
publicly available social media accounts run by individuals and groups. It is often identified 
as the “Manosphere”, a vast online space consisting of inceldom (“involuntary celibates”); 
the RedPill  community that believes in the conspiracy that men are trapped in an illusion 
that women have created to perpetuate “male servitude”; MGTOW (“Men going their own 
way”) who reject engaging with women; and Men’s Rights Activists who vow to protect their 
freedoms against the “feminist enemy”.118 Although such phenomena are seen as West-centric, 
they have reverberated across the globe with various mutations through online games, 
chatrooms, imageboards, online pornography and image/video sharing social media apps. 
In some instances, broad anti-women ideologies have dovetailed with more personalized 
forms manifest as “revenge porn” often crafted by dejected/rejected lovers who make intimate 
scenes public, as well as setting up fake profiles and doxxing that ride on online voyeurism 
and sexual innuendo. In southern India, a case was registered against online trolls who shared 
videos of a schoolteacher with derogatory and sexist epithets when the school released a video 
of her teaching a class to facilitate online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such 
brazen misuse of videos available easily on the internet has raised concerns about privacy and 
safety of women, as materials that float on the net have become an easy resource for stalking, 
eavesdropping, rumor mongering, threats, and extortion. 
In other instances, gender-based abuses do not always contain explicit derogatory content 
but they seek to assert control over political discourse through masculinist interpretations 
of female modesty.  In Indonesia, partisan politics has instrumentalized discourses around 
“womanhood”, enabling religious actors and political groups to fabricate instances of violation 
of religious laws and ethical norms.119 These groups in turn have raised swarming online armies 
117  For more on the Gamergate controversy, see Massanari, A. (2015). #Gamergate and The Fappening:  
How Reddit’s  algorithm, governance, and culture support toxic technocultures. New Media and Society, 
19(3), 329–346.
118  Csuka, L. (2020). “The ideological structure and persuasive force of r/TheRedPill”, Masters’ Thesis, 
LMU Munich. Csuka cites instances where the conceptual apparatuses of these online communities 
have translated into physical attacks in the actual world: “Alek Minassian conducted a terror attack in 
Toronto by driving a van into a crowd, killing ten people and wounding several more in April 2018. Prior 
to his actions, he announced on 4chan his admiration for Elliot Rodger who in 2014 killed six people 
and injured thirteen in Isla Vista. In November 2018, Scott Beierle shot two women in a yoga studio in 
Tallahassee. All three of them identified with and credited their actions explicitly to the conceptual origin 
of inceldom, a community from the Manosphere.”
119  Pratidina, I. (2021). “Motherhood” revisited": Pushing boundaries in Indonesia’s online discourse. In 
S. Udupa, Gagliardone, I., & Hervik, P. (Eds.), Digital Hate: The Global Conjuncture of Extreme Speech. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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against women public figures and minorities. Similarly, anti-immigrant discourses in the UK 
have resorted to gender-based attacks against hijab wearing Muslim women commentators 
online, citing the public goal of women empowerment in twisted ways to further a racist, 
Islamophobic agenda. In India, perpetrators of gender-based abuse have claimed legitimacy 
by invoking the high ideals of nationhood and how their contestations with “pseudoliberal” 
women journalists, activists, and politicians are meant to serve the high ideal of cleaning the 
nation from corrupt ideas. Such practices draw on a longer history of articulating patriotism 
in relation to “moral restraint”, which partly unfolds through a conservative politics focused 
exclusively on regulating sexuality.120 In some cases, abuse escalates to a full-blown shaming 
punishment, where online networks of swears and accusations create a bounded arena for 
shaming sanctions that fall “most heavily on women in terms of governance of sexuality”.  In 
all these cases, gender-based abuses serve as a ground to advance political vigilantism thick 
with moral language. 
Social consequences of shaming punishments have been evident in several high-profile 
Twitter wars in recent years involving politicians, cinema stars, activists, and sports 
celebrities. Their private details have been leaked, and false accusations made on their “moral” 
behavior. Ethnographic work bears evidence to how shaming has been emotionally taxing 
and tactically demanding for many “ordinary” online users active in political debating.121 For 
some users, especially those with the privilege of political party protection or the support of 
news organizations, these attacks have deepened their resolve to continue debating political 
issues online. However, the moral injuries of gender-based abuse have impacted everyday 
interactions among an increasing number of young women entering political debates on 
social media—forcing some to go mild, “neutral” in their opinion, or completely silent. Such 
practices amount to censoring voices by mobilizing “the [online] qualities of viral outrage to 
impose a disproportionate cost on the very act of speaking out”.122 
 
In a comparative study covering Kenya, Senegal, Ethiopia, Uganda and South Africa, researchers 
found that 39% of women who responded to the questions said they were very concerned about 
their safety online.123 28% said they have become more concerned about digital safety over the 
120  Baxi, U. (2009). Humiliation and Justice. In G. Guru (Ed.), Humiliation: Claims and Contexts (pp. 58–78). 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 72.
121  Udupa, 2017.
122  Tufekci, Z. (2018). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. Yale: Yale University 
Press.
123  Iyer, N., Nyamwire, B. & Nabulega, S. (2020). Alternate Realities, Alternate internets. African Feminist 
Research for a Feminist internet. Pollicy. https://ogbv.pollicy.org/report.pdf accessed 2 March 2021.
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past five years because of having experienced or witnessed accounts of online violence and 
attacks. 36% reported sexual harassment online, 33% reported offensive name calling and 27% 
said they were stalked (repeated contact and doxxing). Participants in Kenya highlighted that 
the internet had “promoted novel methods of control through surveillance and tracking.”124 
Several respondents complained about coordinated trolling that threatened to physically hurt 
them, some going so far as to call for the murder of the targeted women.125 Women have 
largely responded to this phenomenon by blocking or deleting perpetrators (66%), ignoring 
them (14%) and deleting their own social media accounts (14%). Very few have used the option 
of reporting to the website or the social media platform (12%). These variegated responses 
suggest that risks of digital communication are still not addressed adequately. On the other 
hand, the effects of gender-based harassment have been very severe in some cases. The same 
study reported that online harassment and attacks on high school girls are on the rise. In 
countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa, traumatic experiences of online harassment have 
driven young women to end their lives.126
  
In a different study, researchers identified growing trends of online violence against women in 
politics during the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya.127 Trolls have especially targeted outspoken 
women politicians fighting for gender equality and social justice, as power contestations 
and political rivalries have exposed them to a deluge of offensive and dangerous messaging 
online. Trolls who attacked a popular woman politician, for instance, created fake and parody 
accounts, demanding that she should share her nude pictures to prove that she was not a 
man. Other violent attacks on women politicians have involved misogynic attention to their 
physical bodies, insults and name calling. 
A common feature of gender-based attacks on women in politics or journalism is that they 
are deeply entwined with conflicts over power and political wrangling. In South Africa, social 
media manipulations of a wealthy business family discussed in the previous section also 
included targeted attacks against outspoken women journalists. Sponsored malign campaigns 
sent out sexist, photoshopped and derogatory images of women journalists, calling them 
“presstitutes” (press as prostitute)—the exact term hurled against women journalists critical 
124  Iyer, Nyamwire & Nabulega 2020, p. 18.
125  Iyer, Nyamwire & Nabulega 2020, p 26.
126  Iyer, Nyamwire & Nabulega 2020, p 43.
127  Kenya ICT Action Network. (2020). Trends of Online Violence against Women in Politics During the 
COVID19  pandemic in Kenya. https://africaninternetrights.org/sites/default/files/Trends-of-Online-
Violence-against-Women-in-Politics-During-the-COVID19-pandemic-in-Kenya.pdf accessed 2 March 
2021.
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of religious majoritarian politics in India.128 In Afghanistan, women journalists voicing their 
opinion against conservative politics have faced similar accusations of prostitution as well 
as death threats online.129 In Uganda, women journalists critical of the government have not 
only received online death threats but have also suffered actual incidents of kidnapping.130 
Same patterns of harassment are seen in Lebanon where women journalists supporting anti-
government protests have seen a flood of fake photos that present them as sexual objects 
in “compromising positions”.131  Their phones have been hacked, photos have been leaked 
without consent, and photoshopped images have been doctored. In these cases, religious 
authority has authenticated conservative politics, urging followers to banish such journalists 
for disrespecting the Islamic law. 
In Saudi Arabia, women commentators and journalists critical of the regime have faced harsh 
consequences online and beyond. In a case that drew media attention, prominent Al Jazeera 
anchor and journalist Ghada Oueiss was the target of pro-Saudi social media accounts in a 
smear campaign after she reported new findings concerning the murder of Saudi journalist 
Jamal Kashoggi in April 2020. In an interview to the International Press Institute, she recounted 
that her phone was hacked and her photos in a Jacuzzi were leaked, and the photoshopped 
images and caricatures showed her in “compromising positions” to suggest that she “obtained 
her position through sexual favors”. 132  
A key aspect of gender-based abuse—online and otherwise—is that its severity is linked to 
other structures of disprivilege, especially when women belong to minoritized or historically 
disadvantaged groups. Women’s rights activists in the global South have noted that, “Women 
who belong to, or are identified as belonging to, religious, racial, or ethnic minority groups, 
Dalit and Bahujan women, the LGBTQI+ community, and women with disabilities face 
disproportionate abuse, misogyny, and violence online.”133  This observation echoes the views 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues: “In the case of online violence targeting 
128  UNESCO. (2018). Journalism `Fake News´& Disinformation. Handbook for Journalism and Training. https:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552 accessed 3 March 2021.
129  https://rsf.org/en/news/afghan-cleric-who-defied-covid-19-lockdown-threatens-woman-journalist  
accessed 2  March 2021.
130  https://rsf.org/en/news/tv-reporter-kidnapped-and-beaten-over-post-about-first-lady accessed 2 March 
2021
131  https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2019/11/8/nobody-knows-lebanons-problems-better-
than-its-women accessed 2 March 2021.
132  https://ipi.media/middle-eastern-journalists-targeted-by-misogynistic-smear-campaigns/  
https://cpj.org/2021/02/ghada-oueiss-hacking-harassment-jamal-khashoggi/ accessed 4 March 2021.
133  Salim, M. (2021). How women from marginalized communities navigate online gendered hate and 
violence. IT for  Change, February.
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minority women such as Muslim and Dalit women, and in countries such as India, Pakistan, 
and Nepal, it’s important for governments to be aware and acknowledge that it is not only 
a gendered issue. These women are doubly targeted and disadvantaged—as women and as 
members of minorities groups who still face abuse, prejudice, and even persecution because 
of their religion or caste.”134  Several accounts of gender-based harassment in South Asia and 
Africa attest to this observation.
Set both within the technocultures of misogyny and specific constellation of power and 
privilege within local political contexts, gender-based abuse has thus emerged as a weaponized 
repertoire to squash dissent, contestation, or the sheer aspiration for political participation. 
A key action frame for UN entities in this area would be “connection”. This suggestion comes 
from a recognition that there are already a large number of creative grassroots initiatives against 
online gender-based abuse that could immensely benefit from the financial, technological and 
tactical support of the UN to increase their effectiveness and scalability. UN entities should 
connect various initiatives that are spread out around the globe, especially by 
 i) creating interfaces to link anti-harassment campaigns crafted in  
  different parts of the world, and 
 ii)  between groups that have evolved tactics to respond to harassment and  
  those that are proactively enunciating feminist politics with the creative  
  use of online channels for video based and multimodal narratives. 
For instance, the “Girls at Dhabas” project in Pakistan invites women in South Asia to “reclaim 
public spaces on their own terms” and publishes the stories of women taking a stroll on the 
streets in the night, or hanging out at “male-only” venues, and celebrating these moments 
of “transgression” and “occupation” through visual and textual narratives online.135 Drawing 
on the benefits of affordable video production and circulation online, the #DigitalHifazat 
campaign in India similarly launched a series of videos to document the narratives of how 
women use the internet.136 These videos provided a platform for women with disabilities, Dalit 
women, queer women, and queer Dalit women to share their experiences. Such multimodal, 
personal narratives have a much stronger potential for change and sensitization than the 
conventional text-based formats of awareness raising. 
134  Mariya Salim’s interview with Fernand de Verennes, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minority 
Issues, cited  in Salim (2021, p. 4).
135  https://girlsatdhabas.wordpress.com accessed 24 Feb 2021.
136  https://feminisminindia.com/2016/11/16/digitalhifazat-campaign-cyber-violence-women-india/ accessed  
3 March 2021.
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The Digital Rights Foundation in Pakistan offers another example for actions such as digital 
safety trainings for women, a cyber harassment helpline (Ab Aur Nahin, not anymore) that 
provides free legal counsel, and campaigns such as “Hamara internet, our internet” to map 
and raise awareness about online harassment using interactive online formats like quizzes.137  
Connecting anti-harassment initiatives in different parts of the world can facilitate interactions 
that will not only provide ways to share resources but also anchor the lessons gained from 
different activities in culturally appropriate frames, since gender rights are not the same in 
different social worlds. Some projects however have a potential to travel across contexts. For 
example, the Peng! Collective’s “Zero Trollerance” campaign in Germany138 in 2015 located 
5000 users who were tweeting abusive content to “harass and incite violence” against women 
and transgender people. These users were identified through a “simple language analysis of 
Twitter data”. Once identified, they were involuntarily enrolled in a six-step self-help program. 
Each day, the “trolls” received a tweet from a “troll coach bot” with a video link to the “day’s 
step” and motivational content to stay away from such behavior. The six-day program came 
with six video tutorials. The organization described this as way to troll the trolls: “We trolled 
the trolls. Except we only used kindness, not hate.” Without doubt, the actual content of such 
videos should stay close to the cultural specificities of different regions, and it is imperative to 
obtain users’ consent, but the strategy to directly address online trolls with well-tailored video 
tutorials holds the potential for similar experiments in other parts of the world.  
Similarly, in a major campaign called #FBrape in 2013, the Women, Action and the Media 
(WAM!) group in the USA and the Everyday Sexism Project139 targeted Facebook advertisers, 
highlighting the consequences of promoting abusive content. A deluge of tweets criticizing 
Facebook’s policies forced 15 major companies to withdraw their advertisements and suspend 
their marketing campaigns on Facebook. Consequently, Facebook agreed to revise its policies 
around moderating gender-based abusive content on its platform. In a related project, 
WAM! and Twitter collaborated for a joint pilot project to create a reporting platform that 
helped to take action against reported content within 24 hours, as well as fine-tuning the 
company’s content moderation standards based on a joint investigation of abusive content.140 
Such initiatives should be extended to different linguistic communities, beyond the English-
speaking world.
137 https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/  accessed 24 Feb 2021.
138  https://pen.gg/campaign/zerotrollerance/ accessed 24 Feb 2021.
139  https://everydaysexism.com/ accessed 24 Feb 2021.
140  https://www.genderit.org/sites/default/files/wam-twitter-abuse-report_1.pdf accessed 15 March 2021.
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Connecting ongoing debates about legislative reforms is yet another area for intervention. 
Digital rights advocates have called for legislative reforms by developing clear thresholds 
to bring targeted gender-based harassment within the definition of criminal speech when 
it has the potential to instigate harm. These have ranged from proposals to enforce stricter 
self-regulation regimes for internet platforms to holding them accountable for disseminating 
explicitly violent content such as death and rape threats by invoking the principle of “absolute 
liability”. Legal practitioners examining gender-based abuse in India, for instance, have argued 
that large internet platforms that “enable toxic masculinity, permit the issuance and wide 
dissemination of death and rape threats, and thus have a chilling effect on the participation 
of women in society on account of fear of abuse both online and offline,” should be treated 
as enterprises engaged in “hazardous or inherently dangerous activity” and are therefore 
“absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by their operations [even if they are 
unintended or accidental]”.141 Such calls for stricter actions against perpetrators of gender-
based abuse and internet platforms hosting such content have increasingly expressed their 
skepticism about counterspeech as an effective strategy. While all caution should be taken 
to avoid regulatory overreach in terms of criminalizing cyberbullying, in the context where 
gender-based attacks can threaten the safety of women and the LGBTQI+ communities, 
advocacy for stricter regulatory frameworks such as bringing harmful gender-based attacks 
within the purview of criminal speech and timely content takedowns is an important step.
Aside from legislative and regulatory reforms, UN entities should connect digital rights 
groups that are involved in capacity building for key actors in the judiciary about the unique 
challenges and effects of online gender-based harassment. Along these lines, digital rights 
groups in India have carried out training sessions for judges to sensitize them about issues 
of online privacy and safety, and the entrenched patriarchy of the law enforcement systems. 
Such measures are important because, “institutions of law and justice carry deep prejudices 
that not only delegitimize the rights of women belonging to minority social groups, but also 
penalize them for their very aspiration and agency to seek justice.”142  
In contexts where gender-based abuse is entangled with partisan or socially conservative 
majoritarian politics targeting minorities and political opponents, the problem has to be 
tackled as part of a broader set of tactics aimed at engaging repressive regimes and gray zones 
(described earlier). In repressive contexts, one of the key activities at the community level is 
141  Raghavan, A. (2021). Legislating an absolute liability standard for intermediaries for gendered cyber abuse. 
IT for  Change, February 2021. https://itforchange.net/sites/default/files/1883/Arti-Raghvan-Rethinking-
Legal-Institutional- Approaches-to-Sexist-Hate-Speech-ITfC-IT-for-Change_0.pdf
142  Salim, M. (2021), p. 3.
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to connect gender rights advocacy groups that have developed digital safety toolkits across 
locations, so that victims are able to directly access these resources regardless of whether 
these advocacy groups have their presence in the countries where victims reside. For instance, 
a victim of gender-based harassment in Lebanon should be able to connect with anti-online 
harassment groups in Pakistan or Germany. Such connections are possible if there is a curated 
space of shared resources that UN entities can host and support. Connecting the victims of 
gender-based abuse is also important in evolving coping strategies, resource sharing, and 
technological competence (blocking, reporting, password protection etc.).
 
In summary
• Connecting creative grassroots initia-
tives against online gender-based abuse 
across diverse locations to increase 
their effectiveness and scalability
• Connection can be achieved by creat-
ing interfaces
i) to link anti-harassment campaigns 
crafted in different parts of the 
world in areas including digital 
safety trainings for women, free 
legal counsel, cyber harassment 
helpline, capacity building for re-
porting abusive content to social 
media platforms, partnerships with 
social media companies for quick 
response/redressal and proposals for 
legislative reforms 
ii) between groups that have evolved 
tactics to respond to harassment 
and those that proactively enunciate 
feminist politics with the creative 
use of online channels for video tu-
torials and multimodal first-person 
narratives
• Targeting social media advertisers to 
demote abusive content
• In contexts where gender-based abuse 
is entangled with partisan or repres-
sive politics targeting minorities and 
political opponents, the problem has 
to be tackled as part of a broader set 
of tactics aimed at engaging repressive 
regimes and gray zones 
• In repressive contexts, one of the key 
activities at the community level is 
to connect gender rights advocacy 
groups that have developed digital 
safety toolkits across locations, so that 
victims are able to directly access these 
resources regardless of whether these 
advocacy groups have their presence 
in the countries where victims reside. 
53DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND EXTREME SPEECH
BILATERAL AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERVENTIONS
*Key action frames: Intermediation and awareness*
Extreme speech is also a weaponized tool in bilateral and geopolitical conflicts to create and 
reinforce sentiments of mistrust, exclusion, fear, and anger toward perceived external enemies, 
and simultaneously to unite allies.143 Their instrumental use and impact—under the labels 
of propaganda and psychological warfare—have been widely documented and researched, 
as this phenomenon predates digital communication.  In the latest digital manifestations, 
propagandists acting on behalf of nation states have sought to combine hateful content with 
organized disinformation attacks. Security and defense studies have framed the emerging 
trends of digital information disorder as “information warfare,” arguing that imagination 
has become the primary target of manipulation in the information era.144 The impact of 
manipulative actions is based on stimulating emotions such as enthusiasm or fear. In the 
context of modern hybrid warfare, disinformation and manipulation blur the terms of war 
and make it imprecise in the field of international law. Studies have identified a malign 
chain of cause and effect between disinformation campaigns of ISIS, Russia, and the Trump 
establishment, who all used strategies of weaponizing the grievances of those who felt left out 
by economic globalization.  These trends are complex because of the involvement of nonstate 
actors who use information technologies to support asymmetric tactics that spark conflict. 
Tactics adopted by state apparatuses have resulted in attempts to exploit fragilities and 
polarizations within specific national polities, targeting ordinary users as active participants 
in the spread of hate and disinformation. 
During the MH17 plane crash in Ukraine, citizen users acted as curators of pro-Kremlin 
disinformation by producing, selecting and spreading the most popular content about the 
event on Twitter.145 It is not only the state-supported media monopoly that produces and 
disseminates propaganda in the context of Russia-Ukraine, but citizens themselves who 
143  Udupa, S., Gagliardone, I., Deem, A., & Csuka, L. (2020). Field of disinformation, democratic processes and 
conflict prevention. Social Science Research Council, February. https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/ 
the-field-of-disinformation-democratic-processes-and-conflict-prevention-a-scan-of-the-literature/
144  Arazna, M. (2015). Conflicts in the 21st century based on multidimensional warfare: “Hybrid warfare”, 
disinformation  and manipulation. Security and Defence Quarterly, 8(3), 103–129; See also Lewandowsky, 
S., Stritzke, W. G. K., Freund, A. M., Oberauer, K., & Krueger, J. (2013). Misinformation, Disinformation, 
and Violent Conflict: From  Iraq and the ‘War on Terror’ to Future Threats to Peace. American 
Psychologist, 68(7), 487–501; Richey, M. (2017). Contemporary Russian revisionism: Understanding the 
Kremlin’s hybrid warfare and strategic and tactical deployment of disinformation. Asia Europe Journal, 
16(1), 101–113.
145  Golovchenko, Y., Hartmann, M., & Adler-Nissen, R. (2018). State, media and civil society in the 
information warfare over Ukraine: Citizen curators of digital disinformation. International Affairs, 94(5), 
975–994.
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further their own disenfranchisement by using social media to generate, consume or distribute 
disinformation.146 Studies have argued that these developments have undermined the autonomy 
and agency of civil society in the region. 
Similarly, in the Arab world, online extreme speech should be understood as a factor in the ongoing 
configurations of rivalries and alliances, which go beyond the national frameworks. Scholars have 
shown how, for instance, media-politics relationship in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia “cannot be 
understood without reference to the relations between them and to the wider transnational context 
of media and politics in the Arab world”.147 Online extreme speech flows between Pakistan and 
India, the two South Asian rivals, reveal orchestrated messaging that is picked up and augmented 
by ordinary users, amounting to reifying the external enemy as well as building internal solidarities, 
often with interests to consolidate power domestically. 
Iran’s internet censorship of domestic voices (mentioned under the ‘repressive regimes’ section) is 
bolstered by a parallel effort to disseminate a pro-Iran propaganda internationally. News reports 
have uncovered a network of propagandistic news websites that operate internationally and in 
multiple languages, to amplify the Supreme Leader’s speeches and push for narratives that justify its 
position vis-à-vis its rivals, namely, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States.148  
In relation to this specific variant of online extreme speech, UN entities should evolve strategies in 
conjunction with diplomatic tools for intermediation and de-escalation, foremost by engaging key 
actors in Member States, introducing independent mediation and expertise, and combining these 
interventions with community level awareness raising activities among ordinary online users.
COMMUNITY LEVEL INTERVENTIONS AND DEEP EXTREME SPEECH 
*Key action frames: Connection, monitoring, awareness*
If one part of online extreme speech circulation relates to technology specific features of virality, 
algorithmic mediation and so on, a significant part of it operates by tapping social trust and 
cultural capital at community levels, often making deep inroads into the “intimate sphere” of 
146  Mejias, U., & Vokuev, N. (2017). Disinformation and the Media: The Case of Russia and Ukraine. Media, 
Culture & Society, 29(7), 1027–1042.
147  Kraidy, M. M. (2012). The rise of transnational media systems Implications of pan-Arab media for 
comparative research. In Hallin, D. & Mancini, P. (Eds.), Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western 
World (pp. 177–200). New York: Cambridge University Press; Hallin and Mancini, 2012, p. 300.
148  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport-idUSKCN1NZ1FT accessed 4 March 2021.
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families, kin networks, neighbors, caste-based groups, ethnic groups and other socially rooted 
formations. As a result, hateful language has developed a panoply of banal expressions laced 
with humor, sarcasm, and popular cultural idioms. At the same time, remixing, mashups, and 
narratives presented as “facts” have led to rumors on social networking sites and messaging 
platforms, provoking disturbing incidents of physical violence.
Patterns of distributing political extreme speech in several countries in the global South 
require a special mention.149 These patterns highlight the limits of Eurocentric regulatory 
models, and how the DSA (2020), for instance, defines “public information”.  With an objective 
to extend the scope of messages that fall within the regulatory ambit, the DSA has defined the 
category of “Dissemination to the public” to include all information that is made available to 
a “potentially unlimited number of persons” and that the “mere possibility to create groups 
of users of a given service should not, in itself, be understood to mean that the information 
disseminated in that manner is not disseminated to the public”.150 To balance this against data 
privacy, it excludes the “dissemination of information within closed groups consisting of a 
finite number of pre-determined persons”, and instead categorizes such type of exchange in 
the realm of “interpersonal communication”. Although these measures appear to be reasonable 
in terms of protecting digital privacy, such understandings belie vastly “creative” practices of 
distributing extreme speech in the global South. 
In India, WhatsApp groups have been remodeled for political “broadcasts’”and “organic 
bottom-up messaging” by installing “party men” within WhatsApp groups of family members, 
friends, colleagues, neighbors and other trusted communities. Typically, a party moderator 
would find his way into these WhatsApp groups through local connections or by leveraging 
“community work” such as local brokerage to help people access state benefits and so on, and 
once admitted, he would relay party messages in unobtrusive ways, often embellished with 
jokes, “good morning” greetings, religious hymns and iconographies,  microlocal development 
work such as water and electricity supply, and other forms of socially vetted and existentially 
relevant content. “WhatsApp penetration”—defined as the extent to which party people 
“organically” embed themselves within trusted WhatsApp groups—is seen as a benchmark 
for a political party’s community reach. Local musicians, poets, cinema stars and other 
community influencers have also been recruited to develop and expand such “organic” social 
media networks for party propaganda. Online extreme speech circulates through networks 
that build on the charisma of local celebrities, social trust, and everyday habits of exchange. 
At the same time, the gray zones of digital manipulation mentioned in the previous section 
149  More research is needed to examine if similar patterns exist in the global North.
150  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN 
accessed 4  March 2021.
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operate at the local levels through an elaborate network of digital influence service providers 
who are ready with a panoply of services—clickbait, GIFs, Facebook likes, Twitter followers 
and so on—that come on a platter with a price tag. It is common for politicians in India, for 
instance, to have their own “social media consultant” whose job is to accompany their boss 
during all the public visits, instantly relay their public engagements by posting images and 
videos online, organize live chats and “watch parties” to ramp up audience, and promote the 
posts to gain traction through coordinated “likes”, which are sometimes purchased from “third 
parties”. The real challenge is then to redefine such intricate networks for positive and just 
narratives. UN missions should strive toward building (relatively) autonomous community 
spaces for countering this kind of “deep extreme speech”—the social variant of technologized 
“deep fakes”—so that social trust as the key engine of online extreme speech is repurposed for 
positive narratives. 
Some examples have included grassroots community level engagements to sensitize school 
children and teachers and preparing them to detect hate and disinformation. UN missions 
should put pressure on social media companies to fund such activities beyond the purview 
of corporate social responsibility and media awareness programs they have initiated. It is 
important that a significant part of community level interventions remain independent from 
direct corporate or political party influence. 
UN entities also have the opportunity to mobilize their grassroots connections and support 
communities that are spearheading efforts to ground digital discourse in democratic values. 
In this direction, encouraging local partners to form community WhatsApp groups to counter 
hateful speech and recruiting local cultural influencers would be critical. These influencers 
should include comedians, poets, musicians, cinema celebrities, online meme creators, 
digital influence service providers, and online game developers. Involving these different 
actors will help to ensure that positive narratives are culturally resonant in local contexts as 
well as digitally contemporary so that such narratives adopt the formats and logics of how 
discourses actually circulate in online networks. During the 2013 elections in Kenya, anti-
hate advocates teamed up with a popular comedy series on television to embed awareness 
raising information about online propaganda and hateful speech in the comedy narrative. 
The result was encouraging. An impact assessment study showed that viewers who watched 
these episodes had a keener grasp of how leaders manipulate their followers with polarizing 
language and better understanding of the legal consequences of engaging in such speech. 151 
Counter speech campaigns should similarly work with digitally native genres of memes, GIFs, 
151  Kogen, L. (2013). Testing a media intervention in Kenya: Vioja Mahakamani, dangerous Speech and the 
Benesch guidelines. Center for Global Communication Studies, p.3. accessed 22 February 2021.
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and humor, and where appropriate, hip-hop, rap, photography and local popular cultures 
(cinema and music). Several ongoing experiments have demonstrated the value of such 
creative interventions. Some of the examples cited under the section on gender-based abuses, 
including multimodal first-person narratives and video tutorials, could be utilized to address 
other forms of content manipulations. In Myanmar, in the midst of violent attacks against 
the Rohingya Muslims both online and offline, Facebook stickers featuring a flower in an 
animated character’s mouth were created as a symbol of peace with the message, “End hate 
speech with flower speech”.152  
Not only the content but the strategies of circulation should also be digitally aware, and 
recognize that the volume of likes and the relative influence of followers (i.e., how central they 
are to the networks) are significant determinants of the campaign’s virality and visibility.153 
An interesting experiment is the #jagärhär (in Sweden) and #ichbinhier (in Germany) 
counterspeech movements that mobilize the reassuring phrase, “I am here” to counter hate 
with polite pushbacks, and back it with coordinated “likes” from others in the movement. Once 
a positive message is sent out to a hate speaker, others in the movement receive notifications 
to like this content, thereby amplifying the circulatory force of counterspeech.
Similarly, in an effort to “fight fire with water”, iheartmob has created a unique project to 
mobilize bystander support in addressing online hate.154  It provides a way for victims of online 
hate to reach out to them and seek immediate online support to resist and cope with the 
trauma of hate speech. Aside from receiving vital information on digital safety and ways to 
discern the severity of threats, victims have the option of making their report public and get 
community support—the “heartmob”—organized by the group. “Bystanders looking to provide 
support will receive public requests, along with chosen actions of support.”155 Such interactive 
community building can provide strong mechanisms of protection and reassurance for online 
hate victims at the local level. Enlisting the support of local NGOs, journalists, students, and 
community workers would be important in building such bystander support.  
An interesting effort that is worth exploring in other contexts is the “Hass hilft [literally, hate 
helps]” project implemented in Germany.156  This organization vows to donate one Euro for 
every “inhuman” comment they encounter online to anti-hate and refugee support groups. 
152  https://www.facebook.com/supportflowerspeech?fref=ts
153  A simple evaluation of indegree, outdegree and Eigenvector centrality measures provides an indication of 
the influence of online users in the public web.
154  HTTPS://IHEARTMOB.ORG/PAGES/FAQS#HEARTMOB accessed 22 February 2021.
155  HTTPS://IHEARTMOB.ORG/PAGES/FAQS#HEARTMOB accessed 24 February 2021.
156  www.hasshilft.de accessed 24 February 2021.
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The premise is that online users who post inhuman comments end up donating for initiatives 
that have taken up the very cause of eliminating such comments.  As the organizers of the 
movement describe, “…all haters and agitators practically donate against themselves”, injecting 
a “dilemma” into the communicational space of hate mongering. 
Another important area for concerted action is to strengthen the community of “trusted 
flaggers”157  and equip grassroots organizations with necessary technological resources to 
report offensive and harmful content to social media companies in a timely manner and 
monitor the progress of their complaints. One of the key activist engagements of Reconquista 
internet group158 in Germany has been to report racist messages and content that glorifies 
violence to Facebook and evaluate and archive the outcome of their reports by monitoring if 
the company took down the content in a timely manner. 
Equally, efforts to strengthen local communities to petition lawmakers to support victims 
of online harassment and raise resources for legal help would be critical. Anti-Defamation 
League’s pioneering work in this area is worth replicating in different parts of the world, 
especially at the national and community levels. This group has also pioneered innovative use 
of AI-assisted models for content flagging and user education.
Importantly, community level efforts should work with local concepts, local cultural idioms 
and regional linguistic repertoire rather than the “suspiciously foreign” semiotic baggage 
of “peace operations”. Utilizing the local cultural repertoires for peace, unity, harmony, 
and cognate concepts is critical for “carving out spaces” that can strengthen and renew the 
legitimacy of the UN.159 Cultural language and narratives adopted by grassroots organizations 
in their diverse engagements around online hate and harassment provide a significant pool of 
resources in this effort. For example, the “Feminism in India” project used hifazat (protection 
in Urdu) for its campaigns against gender-based harassment in India; the anti-hate movement 
in Myanmar was led by a coalition of civil society activists called Panzagar that translates to 
“flower speech” in English; and the community led movement against electoral violence in 
Kenya was named Sisi ni Amani (“we are peace” in Swahili).
Such contextualized interventions should also recognize the effectiveness of different kinds of 
media in a “polymedia environment” where media forms exist in close relation to one another, 
157  See the section on “Platform governance” in this paper.
158  https://t.me/ReconquistaNetz accessed 24 February 2021.
159  https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/10/reflections-on-the-future-of-peacekeeping-operations/ 
accessed 24 February 2021. Miyashita stresses that the success of UN peacekeeping operations will depend 
on the legitimacy the UN itself is seen to have.
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and people navigate a variety of media forms in their everyday lives. This means tackling 
online hate cannot be done entirely within the domain of internet-based media but requires a 
broader and integrated approach based on a thorough mapping of the popularity of different 
kinds of media. To evolve integrated polymedia responses at the community level, UN entities 
should leverage ongoing grassroots media initiatives active in sensitizing people about hateful 
message such as La Benevolencija’s radio programs in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.160  
Initiatives such as the AI4Dignity project (described under ‘global interventions’) that aim 
to both leverage and bring contextual knowledge to AI-assisted content moderation should 
be replicated at the local and country levels to achieve further granularity and linguistic 
diversity in the datasets. Therefore, “Counterathon” events should be organized to create 
collaborative coding spaces for AI/NLP developers, critical intermediaries like fact checkers 
and academic interlocutors at the local and national levels, based on lessons gained from 
international events. The connective network can be fine-tuned further at the community 
levels by creating mechanisms where fact checkers and other anti-hate interlocutors who are 
already in correspondence with specific hate groups are able to connect with them for precise 
interventions. This “matching” can also occur based on the shared ethnic/religious/caste/
linguistic background of anti-hate teams and hate speakers. An interesting study has shown 
that online haters are more likely to accept fact checks published by people who have already 
been interacting with them on social networks.161 This fine-tuning is important because 
hateful expressions and disinformation proliferate when they flow within the networks of 
trust and familiarity, and any efforts at combating them should also operate through such 
trust-based, interactive networks.  
The interactive element in the connective network model can be enhanced further by directly 
engaging with online hate mongers. A key point of departure here is to design interactions that 
have the potential to change user behavior. Defined as “participatory enforcement”162,  these 
efforts insert dynamic interactional frames into hateful exchange online. A good example is 
the #WeCounterHate project that uses AI-identified content to prioritize messages posted on 
Twitter for human review. Once human moderators confirm the content as problematic, the 
system generates a response to “add friction to the user experience” as well as to engage in 
user education.163 Typically, the response would be: “This hate tweet is now being countered. 
Think twice before retweeting. For every retweet, a donation will be committed to a non-profit 
160  http://www.labenevolencija.org/ accessed 24 February 2021.
161  Margolin, D. B., Hannak, A., & Weber, I. (2018). Political fact checking on Twitter: When do corrections 
have an effect? Political Communication, 35, 196–219.
162  Land & Hamilton, 2020, p. 12.
163  Land & Hamilton, 2020, p. 13.
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fighting for equality, inclusion and diversity.” The expected outcome is to at least unsettle the 
atmosphere of normality around hateful exchange and encourage users to reflect on their 
practice. Although social media companies such as Facebook and YouTube have introduced 
some of these features in their user interface, engaging civil society organizations and critical 
community intermediaries will provide further cultural nuance and authenticity to this 
exercise. 
In summary
• Partnering with local cultural influ-
encers for organic influence in social 
media networks (such as WhatsApp 
groups) to promote positive narratives
• Developing counterspeech and posi-
tive campaigns by using memes, GIFs, 
and humorous posts so that they 
are culturally resonant and digitally 
contemporary
• Strengthening counterspeech and pos-
itive campaigns by utilizing the unique 
features of digital circulation such as 
coordinated “likes” to promote such 
posts
• Mobilizing positive narratives and 
awareness raising by extending the 
network of partners to include not 
only conventional beneficiaries such 
as NGOs but also online comedians, 
poets, musicians, cinema celebrities, 
online meme creators, and online game 
developers
• Strengthening grassroots communities 
to report online extreme speech to 
social media companies and monitor 
progress once complaints are raised
• Strengthening local communities to 
petition lawmakers to support victims 
of online harassment and raise resourc-
es for legal help
• Offering technical support to local 
groups to develop hate monitoring 
dashboards
• Empowering local groups to mobilize 
community “bystander support” when 
victims of online hate choose to make 
their complaints public
• Partnering with existing anti-hate 
media programs (radio, television, and 
print) to evolve integrated polymedia 
responses against online hate  
• Developing innovative means of sen-
sitizing hate speakers by channelizing 
donations to antihate groups for every 
instance of offensive and exclusionary 
extreme speech spotted online (in 
other words, hate speakers would be 
funding anti-hate initiatives each time 
they post a hateful message)
• Organizing initiatives such as the 
AI4Dignity project that aim to both 
leverage and bring contextual knowl-
edge to AI-assisted content modera-
tion at the local and country levels to 
achieve further granularity, linguistic 
diversity, and interactivity.
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Across all these levels of intervention and action frames, it is important to recognize that 
extreme speech is not merely a problem of digital communication but of deeper histories 
of racialization, of coloniality of power now manifest as exploitative and racialized data 
relations, and of repressive states that have turned against their own citizens. A context 
sensitive approach calls for a multiprong, rapidly evolving, and robustly flexible mechanism 
that can simultaneously counter existing patterns of digital harms and anticipate trends that 
are simmering and emergent.
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